ESTATE PLANNING--A RACE TO THE POORHOUSE: SHOULD GUARDIANS HAVE A DUTY TO IMPOVERISH THEIR WARDS FOR ASSET PROTECTION PURPOSES THEREBY PRESERVING ASSETS FOR HEIRS? by Pargoff, Angelina M.
Western New England Law Review
Volume 34 34 (2012)
Issue 1 Article 8
6-26-2012
ESTATE PLANNING--A RACE TO THE
POORHOUSE: SHOULD GUARDIANS
HAVE A DUTY TO IMPOVERISH THEIR
WARDS FOR ASSET PROTECTION
PURPOSES THEREBY PRESERVING ASSETS
FOR HEIRS?
Angelina M. Pargoff
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.wne.edu/lawreview
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Review & Student Publications at Digital Commons @ Western New England
University School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Western New England Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons
@ Western New England University School of Law. For more information, please contact pnewcombe@law.wne.edu.
Recommended Citation
Angelina M. Pargoff, ESTATE PLANNING--A RACE TO THE POORHOUSE: SHOULD GUARDIANS HAVE A DUTY TO
IMPOVERISH THEIR WARDS FOR ASSET PROTECTION PURPOSES THEREBY PRESERVING ASSETS FOR HEIRS?, 34 W.






      05/09/2012   13:22:53
31827-wne_34-1 Sheet No. 130 Side A      05/09/2012   13:22:53
C M
Y K





ESTATE PLANNING—A RACE TO THE  POORHOUSE: SHOULD 
GUARDIANS1  HAVE A  DUTY TO  IMPOVERISH  THEIR  WARDS2 FOR 
ASSET PROTECTION PURPOSES THEREBY PRESERVING ASSETS FOR 
HEIRS? 
INTRODUCTION 
Imagine working your entire life and planning to leave your 
assets to your loved ones only to have those assets completely de­
pleted by the cost of long-term care. This is not an unrealistic sce­
nario and is faced by people young and old.3  So-called “Medicaid 
planning” is one means people use to legally divest themselves of 
their assets, which accomplishes the dual purpose of creating Medi­
caid eligibility and protecting their assets so they may be distributed 
to loved ones.4 
Donald Domey, for example, suffered a stroke in October 2003 
that left him completely incapacitated.5  Because of Donald’s 
mental incapacity, he was placed under guardianship and moved 
into a long-term care facility.6  Donald’s estate was valued at 
$730,000 in total assets, with about $353,177 consisting of liquid as­
sets and the remaining $385,500 consisting primarily of the marital 
1. In most states, guardian refers to a substitute decision maker for both person 
and property. LAWRENCE A. FROLIK, THE  LAW OF  LATER-LIFE  HEALTH  CARE AND 
DECISION  MAKING 159-160 (2006).  Yet other states use the terms “conservator” and 
“conservatorship” to refer to a substitute decision maker regarding an individual’s 
property. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS. ch. 190B, § 5-101(2) (2008); N.H. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 464-A:2(IX) (2004); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 3B:13A-1 (West 1983); N.Y. MENTAL 
HYG. LAW § 81.03(a) (McKinney 2006).  For purposes of this note “guardian” and 
“guardianship” will include the duties of a “conservator” or “conservatorship.” Id. 
2. “The incapacitated individual, for whom a guardian or conservator has been 
appointed, is often referred to as the ‘ward’ although some states have adopted the 
nomenclature of ‘incapacitated person,’ with a few states retaining the older term ‘in­
competent.’” FROLIK, supra note 1, at 160; see, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS. ch. 190B, § 5­
101(22) (2008) (using the term “[p]rotected person”); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 464-A:2 
(XVI) (2004) (using the term “[w]ard”); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 3B:1-2 (West 2007) (provid­
ing definitions for “[i]ncapacitated individual” and “[w]ard”). For purposes of this 
Note, “ward” will refer to an incapacitated individual who has an appointed guardian. 
3. See infra Part I.A. (noting that over 1.6 million individuals reside in nursing 
homes) and Part I.C. (discussing the costs of nursing home care and private pay 
methods). 
4. See infra Part II.B. (discussing Medicaid planning and strategies). 
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252 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:251 
home and other real estate.7  By October 2005, only two years after 
Donald’s stroke, the care provided by the nursing home “had 
eroded the liquid assets of the estate, leaving [only] $75,000,” ren­
dering Donald eligible for Medicaid shortly thereafter.8 
Donald’s wife argued that Donald’s guardians owed her a duty 
of support.9  The court disagreed and noted that the “primary ob­
jective [of a guardian] is to protect the well-being of the ward,” and 
the guardian’s “primary duty . . . is to protect the estate’s assets in 
order to apply them for the support and care of the ward.”10  The 
court further noted that a guardian would owe a duty to Donald’s 
wife only “when there is a showing of need and when there are 
‘more than sufficient’ resources to provide” for Donald’s care.11 
The court in In re Guardianship of Domey, held that a guardian has 
no duty to impoverish their ward to obtain Medicaid eligibility so 
that assets can be protected and distributed to others.12  Rather, the 
guardian “has the option to . . . engage in estate planning.”13 
Concerns about paying for the costs of care and distributing 
assets are not merely for the elderly.14  Bipin Shah was not yet fifty 
years old when he was seriously injured at work, subsequently be­
came comatose, and diagnosed as unlikely to improve15  Bipin’s 
wife was appointed as his guardian and sought to transfer his assets 
to herself, which would have enabled Bipin to qualify for Medi­
caid.16  The court recognized “that any person in [this] condition 
would prefer that the costs of his care be paid by the State, as op­
posed to his family.”17  The court held “that a guardian spouse is 
7. Id. at 731. 
8. Id. at 732. 
9. Id. at 733.  Donald’s wife specifically argued that N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 546­
A:2 (2007) when read in conjunction with N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 464-A:26(I) (2004), 
imposed a duty on the guardians “to perform all other duties required by law,” and thus 
the guardian had a legal duty to support the ward’s spouse. Id. (quoting N.H. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 464-A:26(I) (2004)); see also N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 546-A:2 (2007). 
10. Domey, 960 A.2d at 733. 
11. Id. (emphasis added). 
12. Id. at 733-34. 
13. Id. at 734. 
14. S.S. v. State, 972 P.2d 439, 440 (Utah 1998) (noting that a “[s]ixteen-year-old 
. . . suffered massive brain damage and was permanently disabled” in a motorcycle 
accident and was ultimately placed in a nursing home care). But see infra Part I.A 
(noting that nursing home residents are mostly elderly). 
15. In re Shah, 733 N.E.2d 1093, 1094-95 (N.Y. 2000). 
16. Id. at 1095.  Although Bipin was not in a nursing home, his care was ex­
tremely expensive (about $1,600 per day). Id. 
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253 2012] MEDICAID PLANNING AND DUTIES OF GUARDIANS 
permitted to [engage in] Medicaid planning . . . pursuant to Mental 
Hygiene Law article 81.”18 
In fact, the Shah court specifically noted that the potential 
powers of a guardian are “not contingent on the particular purpose 
for the transfer [and] the guardian can make gifts, provide support 
for dependents and, simultaneously, apply for government bene­
fits.”19  Still, despite the broad range of potential authority given to 
guardians, the court declined to impose a duty on them to engage in 
planning to protect the ward’s assets.20 
Although each state provides its own laws governing guardian 
duties and powers, a court may authorize guardians to engage in 
estate planning and Medicaid planning on behalf of their wards.21 
Currently there is a wide degree of variance among the states. 
While some states impose a duty on guardians to propose a Medi­
caid spend-down, other states do not impose a duty, but instead 
have a presumption in favor of approving a spend-down.  Still other 
states are incredibly hesitant to authorize guardian proposed spend­
downs.22 
This Note argues that guardians should have a duty to petition 
the court for approval of a Medicaid spend-down when the ward 
requires indefinite nursing home care.  Imposing a duty on guardi­
ans ensures that vulnerable individuals (the wards) facing ruinously 
expensive nursing home costs receive adequate protection— 
namely, the ability to preserve assets for loved ones while still fi­
nancing the costs of long-term care.  Moreover, imposing a duty on 
guardians potentially enables the wards to dispose of their property 
as a competent individual would, while ensuring that the courts re­
tain adequate flexibility and discretion to approve or disapprove 
the proposed spend-down based on the state’s current guardianship 
laws. 
Part I of this Note provides background on Medicaid, nursing 
home care costs, and methods of financing nursing home care 
through both private-pay and government benefits.  Part II pro­
vides background on the current Medicaid transfer laws, Medicaid 
18. Id. at 1098-99; see also N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 81.21 (McKinney 2006). 
19. Shah, 733 N.E.2d at 1099. 
20. Id. at 1099 (indicating that the statute provides that a court may authorize 
guardians to engage in Medicaid planning); see also N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 81.21. 
21. See infra Appendix (providing citations for guardian statutes); see also infra 
Part II.D. 
22. Infra Part II.D. (discussing the laws of different states as they apply to guard­
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254 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:251 
planning strategies, and provides an overview of Medicaid planning 
initiated by guardians.  Part III argues that imposing a duty on 
guardians to propose Medicaid spend-downs is necessary to achieve 
adequate protection for the ward facing an indefinite term of nurs­
ing home care. 
I. MEDICAID AND ITS APPLICABILITY TO NURSING HOME CARE 
A. Medicaid and Nursing Homes 
Medicaid was first enacted in 1965 and is a joint, federal-state 
funded program that provides medical insurance for those who 
meet specified eligibility standards.23  The federal Medicaid statute 
establishes general guidelines for the program, which is adminis­
tered by each participating state.24  Because the states administer 
their plans in accordance with the general federal regulations, the 
interpretation and application of the federal rules vary with each 
jurisdiction.25  The way “Medicaid operates in any particular state 
can be answered only by careful examination of the state law, regu­
lations, and state program manuals as well as the actual enforce­
ment of those rules.”26  Although each state plan varies, no state 
plan can be more restrictive or provide fewer benefits than the fed­
23. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396 (2010); JULIE  STONE, CONG. RESEARCH  SERV., RL 
33593, MEDICAID COVERAGE FOR LONG-TERM CARE: ELIGIBILITY, ASSET TRANSFERS, 
AND ESTATE RECOVERY 1 (2008) (“Medicaid . . . covers about 57 million people across 
the nation, including children and families, persons with disabilities, pregnant women, 
and the elderly.”); FROLIK, supra note 1, at 128 (noting specifically that on average 
states pay for about half the costs of Medicaid); see also Medicaid Rules, ELDER L. 
ANSWERS, http://www.elderlawanswers.com/Elder_Info/Elder_Article.asp?id=2751 (last 
visited Apr. 15, 2012) (providing important general information about Medicaid which 
was contributed by practicing attorneys throughout the United States). See generally 
U.S. DEP’T OF  HEALTH & HUMAN  SERVS., MEDICAID  AT-A-GLANCE 2005 1 (2005) 
[hereinafter MEDICAID AT-A-GLANCE], available at http://www.cms.gov/MedicaidData 
SourcesGenInfo/downloads/maag2005.pdf. 
The Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111–152, 
124 Stat. 1029, contains an individual mandate that expands Medicaid coverage, thereby 
compelling states to provide Medicaid benefits to significant numbers of people.  Flor­
ida ex rel. Attorney Gen. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 780 F.Supp.2d 1256, 
1265 (N.D. Fla. 2011), reversed in part, 648 F.3d 1235 (11th Cir. 2011), cert granted, 132 
S. Ct. 604 (2011).  The constitutionality of this legislation, which could affect long-term 
care eligibility requirements set forth in 42 U.S.C. § 1396 is being examined by the 
Supreme Court as of the publication date of this Note. 
24. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 1396 (2006); JEFF SADLER, THE LONG-TERM CARE 
HANDBOOK 75-80 (1996) (providing information about the joint federal-state laws); 
MEDICAID AT-A-GLANCE, supra note 23. 
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255 2012] MEDICAID PLANNING AND DUTIES OF GUARDIANS 
eral law requires.27  In fact, long-term care28 is one service each 
state’s Medicaid plan must provide.29 
Nursing homes are the institutions most often identified with 
long-term care.30  In fact, over 1.6 million individuals (most elderly) 
reside in nursing homes.31  Nursing homes provide long-term care 
to a range of residents from those with chronic conditions, to those 
requiring shorter-term care for recovery after hospitalization.32 
27. “The Federal Government shares the costs of Medicaid with States that elect 
to participate in the program.  In return, participating States are to comply with require­
ments imposed by the Act and by the Secretary of Health and Human Services.”  At­
kins v. Rivera, 477 U.S. 154, 156-57 (1986); accord Pharmcare Okla., Inc. v. State 
Health Care Auth., 152 P.3d 267, 269-70 (Okla. Civ. App. 2006) (holding that if a state 
chooses to participate in the Medicaid program it must comply with federal statutes and 
regulations). 
For example, each state must contain certain mandatory provisions of the federal 
statute including: the mandatory statewide effect of a program; the types and amounts 
of medical assistance; and reasonable standards for determining eligibility and the ex­
tent of medical assistance needed.  42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a) (2006); see also 79 AM. JUR. 2D 
Welfare § 34 (2008) (listing specific services states must provide).  Additionally, Medi­
caid eligibility, care, and services must be provided in a manner consistent with the best 
interests of recipients.  42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(19) (2006).  See generally 79 AM. JUR. 2D 
Welfare § 36 (2008); Medicaid Eligibility, CTR. FOR  MEDICARE & MEDICAID  SERV. 
(Aug. 11, 2011, 4:52 PM), http://www.cms.gov/MedicaidEligibility/01_Overview.asp 
(discussing generally Medicaid eligibility). 
28. “Long-term care refers to a wide range of supportive and health services for 
persons who have lost the capacity for self-care due to illness, cognitive disorders, or a 
physically disabling condition.” STONE, supra note 23, at 1 n.1.  Examples of medical 
conditions that create the need for long-term care include dementia, strokes, or cardio­
vascular disorders. FROLIK, supra note 1, at 93.  The goal of long-term care is palliative 
(rather than curative), which aims to maintain the patient’s level of care and provide 
comfort. Id. 
29. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10); see 79 AM. JUR. 2D Welfare § 34 (2008) (listing spe­
cific services states must provide, including nursing facility services). 
30. FROLIK, supra note 1, at 72.  The federal law defines the term “nursing home” 
as “an institution that provides skilled nursing care or rehabilitation services for injured, 
disabled, or sick persons.” Id. at 72; see also 42 U.S.C. § 1396r(a) (providing a more 
detailed definition of nursing home).  The federal law notes that nursing facilities pro­
vide health-related care and services above the level of room and board to individuals 
who require it due to their mental and physical condition.  42 U.S.C. § 1396r(a)(1)(C). 
See generally FROLIK, supra note 1, at 63 (providing definitions and discussion of other 
long-term housing options, like assisted living, that provide a lower level of care than 
nursing homes). 
31. FROLIK, supra note 1, at 72.  In fact, “[fifteen percent] of all residents were 
under the age of 65” and the average age of residents is about 83 years old. METLIFE 
MATURE MARKET INSTITUTE, MARKET SURVEY OF LONG-TERM CARE COSTS 6 (Oct. 
2009), available at http://www.metlife.com/assets/cao/mmi/publications/studies/mmi­
market-survey-nursing-home-assisted-living.pdf. 
32. METLIFE MATURE MARKET INSTITUTE, supra note 31, at 6.  Only a nursing 
home may offer skilled nursing care, which is defined by the federal regulations as care 
“so inherently complex that it can be safely and effectively performed only by, or under 
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256 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:251 
While nursing homes are eager to fill beds, admission is contingent 
upon the individual’s insurance coverage and the nursing home 
agreeing to provide care.33  Generally, many nursing homes prefer 
private-pay patients because they can charge more for providing 
the same services than Medicaid will usually reimburse.34 
B. Federal and State Government Concerns 
Because their residents are in such vulnerable condition, nurs­
ing homes are highly regulated by both state and federal govern­
ments.35  Since a nursing home cannot operate without a state 
license, states are able to regulate nursing home operations through 
their licensing authority.36  Additionally, the federal government 
has considerable influence over nursing home operations through 
Medicaid reimbursement programs37 as “[o]nly a small minority of 
nursing homes do not accept or rely upon Medicaid . . . .”38  Conse­
quently, if a nursing home relying on Medicaid reimbursements 
fails to comply with federal regulations, it could lose its reimburse­
ment and, as a result, face financial disaster.39 
By contrast, assisted living facilities provide only custodial care, which “help[s] with the 
activities of daily living” such as dressing, eating, bathing, and mobility “that can be 
provided by nonmedical personnel.” FROLIK, supra note 1, at 121; see STONE, supra 
note 23, at 1 n.2. 
33. See FROLIK, supra note 1, at 121 See generally SADLER, supra note 24, at 51­
55; METLIFE MATURE MARKET INSTITUTE, Since You Care: Making the Nursing Home 
Choice, METLIFE (2006), available at http://www.metlife.com/assets/cao/mmi/publica­
tions/since-you-care-guides/mmi-making-nursing-home-care-choice.pdf (providing fur­
ther discussion on choosing a nursing home). 
34. FROLIK, supra note 1, at 75.  While a nursing home has the right to accept 
only private-pay patients, this is impractical for most facilities, and they will be unable 
to fill their beds if they do not accept some Medicaid patients. Id.  Some states prevent 
nursing homes from giving preference to private pay patients and require a certain 
number of Medicaid patients to be admitted. Id. at 76. 
35. FROLIK, supra note 1, at 74; see, e.g., 42 C.F.R. § 483.35 (2010) (requiring that 
nursing homes provide “nourishing, palatable, well-balanced” meals); 42 C.F.R. 
§ 483.40 (2010) (requiring nursing home residents to be examined by a physician 
regularly). 
36. FROLIK, supra note 1, at 75. 
37. Id.  This author would like to note that federal Medicare reimbursements also 
ensure compliance with federal regulations, however, this Note focuses entirely on 
Medicaid; a discussion of Medicare is beyond the scope of this Note. For additional 
information on Medicare, see generally FROLIK, supra note 1 at 1-40; 70C AM. JUR. 2D 
Social Security & Medicare §§ 2044-2682 (2008) (providing a detailed outline of Medi­
care eligibility, payment and claims for benefits, and appeals process). 
38. FROLIK, supra note 1, at 75. 
39. Id.  The concern over losing federal funding is highly relevant as residents 
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257 2012] MEDICAID PLANNING AND DUTIES OF GUARDIANS 
C. Covering the Costs of Nursing Home Care: Private-Pay 
Nursing home care is costly and individual residents must find 
a way to pay for their care.40  On average, nursing home care costs 
approximately “$5,000 to $8,000 or more a month.”41  A 2009 Met-
Life survey of selected nursing homes noted a national average rate 
for a semi-private room of $198 daily or $72,270 annually; these 
figures indicate a 3.7% increase from the average rates in 2007.42 
40. See, e.g., Rainey v. Guardianship of Mackey, 773 So.2d 118, 118 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 2000) (noting that the ward had about “$78,725 in assets, a monthly income of 
$980.97, and a monthly deficit of $4,377.78” and her guardians alleged that the ward 
“would deplete all of her assets to pay for her nursing expenses in 10.64 months”); In re 
Guardianship of Domey, 960 A.2d 729, 731-32 (N.H. 2008) (noting that in December 
2004 the ward had over $730,000 in assets with a monthly income of about $5,700, but 
the costs of the ward’s care quickly depleted his assets and he qualified for Medicaid 
about two years later); In re Keri, 853 A.2d 909, 911-12 (N.J. 2004) (noting that the 
ward’s “monthly nursing home expenses [were] $6,500”); In re Labis, 714 A.2d 335, 336 
(N.J. App. Div. 1998) (noting that while the ward “was treated at the Morris Hills Mul­
ticare Center” the cost of care was “$10,000 per month”); In re Shah, 694 N.Y.S.2d 82, 
83 (App. Div. 1999) (noting that the ward’s hospital “care amounts to over $1,000 per 
day” with a private pay rate “of $1,608.13 per day”) aff’d, 95 N.E.2d 148 (2000); In re 
John, 652 N.Y.S.2d 329, 330 (App. Div. 1996) (approving a proposed Medicaid spend-
down which left the ward “with approximately $150,000 in assets . . . together with [an] 
annual income [of] (approximately $33,000) which was enough to cover the ward’s nurs­
ing home costs for only 36 months”). 
41. FROLIK, supra note 1, at 94. See, e.g., 130 MASS. CODE REGS. 520.016 (2009) 
(providing the relevant asset limitations in Massachusetts); see also, e.g., 20 KATE MC­
EVOY, CONNECTICUT PRACTICE, CONNECTICUT ELDER LAW § 7:17 (2011) (setting forth 
Connecticut’s Medicaid asset limitations as provided by the Department of Social Ser­
vices’ Uniform Policy Manual). See generally State Information, ELDER L. ANSWERS 
(2008), http://www.elderlawanswers.com/ (providing information about each state’s av­
erage monthly cost for nursing home care, under the “state information” heading, 
which provides a link to “key Medicaid information” for each state once the drop-down 
menu for a particular state is selected). 
42. Compare METLIFE MATURE MARKET INSTITUTE, supra note 31, at 4-5, 14-19 
(noting that the average daily rate for nursing home care in a semi-private room is 
$198), with STONE, supra note 23, at 2 & n.3 (noting that the average daily rate for a 
semi-private room was $189 according to a MetLife Market Survey of Nursing Home 
and Assisted Living Costs published in 2007). 
The cost of $198 per day is an average cost, so some nursing homes may have 
higher or lower daily rates. See, e.g., State Information, supra note 41 (noting that the 
average monthly cost of nursing home care in New York is approximately $9,500 (about 
$316 per day) which is above average, while the average monthly cost in Idaho is $5,994 
(about $197 per day) which is below average). 
Similarly, a MetLife Market Survey noted that the highest daily rate for a semi­
private room in a New York nursing home is $500 with a state average of $323, which is 
still well above the national average. METLIFE  MATURE  MARKET  INSTITUTE, supra 
note 31, at 17.  By contrast, the highest daily rate for a semi-private room in a Missouri 
nursing home is $179, with a state average of $134, both numbers being well below the 
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258 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:251 
Although nursing home care is costly, individuals may still look to 
several private-pay options to cover these expenses.43 
One option for financing nursing home care is through sources 
of private-pay such as personal savings, annuities, refinancing the 
home, reverse mortgages, or selling the home, to name a few.44  For 
individuals who resort to paying through personal savings, some 
may be able to bear the cost; however, by purchasing the level of 
care they desire, they will greatly deplete or completely exhaust 
their savings.45  On the other hand, if the individuals have only 
modest savings, they may be “house rich,” and the sale of their 
homes can create a pool of funds that will often meet the costs of 
nursing home care for some period of time.46  In either case, it is 
apparent that private funding alone is insufficient to finance nursing 
home care if people do not wish to deplete their savings. 
Another option for financing nursing home care is long-term 
care insurance.47  In general, these “policies pay benefits when the 
insured has physical or mental impairments significant enough to 
require daily assistance.”48  However, most people are unable to fi­
nance their entire cost of long-term care with long-term care insur­
ance, because the daily cost of nursing home care almost always 
43. See Paying for Long-Term Care, MEDICARE.GOV (Apr. 10, 2007), http://www. 
medicare.gov/longtermcare/static/PayingOverview.asp (listing and providing the costs 
and risks of several private-pay options which include: personal savings, long-term care 
insurance, and reverse mortgages, to name a few). 
44. See generally FROLIK, supra note 1, at 94-154 (providing in depth description 
and use of private pay methods for nursing home patients). 
45. Id. at 94; see, e.g., supra note 40 (providing examples of how quickly the costs 
of care can exhaust the ward’s assets). 
46. FROLIK, supra note 1, at 95. 
47. Id. at 117.  It is estimated that private insurance pays about 7.2% of the na­
tional long-term care costs. National Spending on Long-Term Care, U.S. DEP’T OF  
HEALTH & HUMAN  SERVS. (May 12, 2010, 6:27 PM), http://www.longtermcare.gov/ 
LTC/Main_Site/Paying/Private_Financing/LTC_Insurance/Buying.aspx; see also 
FROLIK, supra note 1, at 112-27 (providing a more detailed discussion on long-term 
insurance benefits); MetLife Mature Market Institute, Purchasing Long-Term Care In­
surance: Ten Key Considerations, METLIFE (2009), available at http://www.metlife.com/ 
assets/cao/mmi/publications/helpful-hints/mmi-puchasing-long-term-care-insurance-ge­
neric.pdf (providing general information about long-term care insurance and important 
considerations before purchasing a policy); Map of NAIC States & Jurisdictions, NAIC, 
http://naic.org/state_web_map.htm (last visited Apr. 15, 2012) (providing general infor­
mation about long-term care insurance and links to each state’s department of 
insurance). 
48. FROLIK, supra note 1, at 117.  See id. at 120 for more specific information on 
the required physical or mental deficits.  Some policies pay a fixed per-diem amount for 
every day the insured qualifies for benefits and lives in a nursing home, some policies 
pay a percentage of the daily rate for a pre-set daily limit, and other policies pay all 
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259 2012] MEDICAID PLANNING AND DUTIES OF GUARDIANS 
exceeds the daily benefit paid by the policy.49  Moreover, before 
issuing a policy, the insurer will require the insured to have a physi­
cal examination,50 which enables the insurance company to assess 
the risk in insuring a particular individual based on age and pre­
existing medical conditions.51  Individuals must balance the costs of 
buying long-term care insurance early in life and paying premiums 
for many years against the possibility of delaying the purchase and 
being denied coverage due to health problems and old age.52  In 
any case, long-term care insurance, by itself, will likely be insuffi­
cient to cover the complete costs of nursing home care. 
D. Covering the Costs of Nursing Home Care: Medicaid 
The final option for financing nursing home care is govern­
ment-subsidized benefits.  Medicaid is the most popular means for 
financing nursing home care.53  In fact, Medicaid is “the largest sin­
gle source of financing for long-term care,”54 “paying for almost 
half of all long-term care spending in the United States.”55  Medi­
caid typically covers the costs of nursing home care in excess of the 
amount that a Medicaid-eligible individual is capable of paying.56 
Even though Medicaid eligibility requires proof of “financial need,” 
nursing home care is so costly that “many middle-class elderly who 
reside in nursing homes are driven into poverty,” thus rendering 
them Medicaid-eligible.57 
Individuals will qualify for Medicaid only if they meet the pro­
gram’s “categorical and financial eligibility requirements.”58  The 
categories of people who may qualify for Medicaid coverage in­
clude individuals 65 or older, certain disabled individuals, parents 
49. Id. at 117. 
50. Id. at 123. 
51. Id. at 123-24. 
52. Id. at 124. 
53. Medicare does cover some nursing home costs but provides limited reim­
bursement and typically only reimburses care that qualifies as “skilled nursing” care.  42 
C.F.R. §§ 409.31, .32 (2010).  A lengthy discussion of Medicare coverage is outside the 
scope of this Note; for more specific information on Medicare, see generally 42 U.S.C 
§ 1395 (2006) (federal statute governing Medicare); FROLIK, supra note 1 (addressing 
Medicare coverage in Chapter One). 
54. STONE, supra note 23, at 1; see also FROLIK, supra note 1, at 128. 
55. FROLIK, supra note 1, at 128.  Medicaid pays approximately 49% of all long-
term care services. National Spending on Long-Term Care, supra note 47. 
56. FROLIK, supra note 1, at 128. 
57. Id. at 129; see, e.g., supra note 40 (listing examples of cases in which the costs 
of care depleted the ward’s assets). 
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and children, and pregnant women.59  However, coverage of nurs­
ing home costs typically falls into the category of aged persons or 
persons with disabilities.60 
After individuals satisfy Medicaid’s categorical requirement, 
they must also meet the financial requirement.61  This requirement, 
commonly referred to as a standard or threshold, limits the amount 
of income and assets an individual may possess before qualifying.62 
These criteria are usually met in the following ways: 
(1) [people] have income and assets equal to or below the state-
specified thresholds; (2) [people] deplete their income and assets 
on the cost of their care, thus “spending down”; or (3) [people] 
divest of their assets to meet these income and asset standards 
sooner than they otherwise might if they had to spend their in­
come and assets on the cost of their care.63 
Because the thresholds are set through a combination of federal 
guidelines and state definitions, the specific income and asset re­
strictions vary among states.64 
The asset limitations usually require individuals to satisfy a re­
source eligibility test.  Following federal parameters, the states set 
standards stipulating the uppermost amount of countable assets a 
person may possess while still qualifying for Medicaid.65  Generally, 
individuals satisfy the resource eligibility test if they have no more 
than $2,000 in countable resources (e.g. “savings accounts, stocks, 
or other equities”).66  The value of assets may be counted entirely, 
59. Id.; see 42 U.S.C § 1396a (2006); FROLIK, supra note 1, at 130-33. 
60. STONE, supra note 23, at 4. 
61. Id. 
62. Id. 
63. Id. at 1. 
64. Id. at 4. 
65. Id. at 7; see also id. at 37-45 (providing a Table with detailed information 
about excludability of assets under SSI); Definition of a Resource for the SSI Program, 
SOC. SECURITY  ONLINE (Oct. 20, 2011, 9:12 AM), http://ssa-custhelp.ssa.gov/app/an­
swers/detail/a_id/412/kw/countable/session/L3RpbWUvMTI4Njg0NTY2MS9zaWQvZ 
HZvVVJmY2s%3D (providing definition of a resource for the SSI program). See gen­
erally FROLIK, supra note 1, at 132-33 (citing specific examples of non-countable as­
sets); Countable Income for SSI Program, SOC. SECURITY ONLINE (last modified Oct. 
13, 2011), http://www.ssa.gov/OACT/COLA/countableincome.html (providing Social 
Security’s definition of countable income). 
66. STONE, supra note 23, at 7; see also FROLIK, supra note 1, at 132-33 (listing 
examples of non-countable assets which include: the principal residence, the value of 
household goods, engagement rings, and a non-revocable burial contract). 
It is also important to note that special rules apply to an individual’s primary place 
of residence.  Under federal law, the applicant’s equity interest in the home is exempt 
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excluded entirely, or excluded partially while counting the remain­
ing portion.67  Individuals retaining countable resources in excess of 
the maximum amount allowed by their state “must ‘spend down’ 
those resources by paying for the costs of their medical care, by 
converting the resource into a non-countable resource, or by paying 
support needs for themselves or their spouse.”68 




A. Medicaid Planning in General 
Medicaid planning is the process by which individuals protect 
their assets by giving them to loved ones, or spending them, to cre­
ate eligibility.69  Because nursing home care is so costly, individuals 
could quickly deplete the resources they have built over a life­
time.70  For example, if an individual sold his or her home to create 
equity amount.  42 U.S.C. § 1396p(f)(1)(B) (2006).  Any equity in excess of the amount 
chosen by the state is considered an available asset.  42 U.S.C. § 1396p(f)(1)(A) (2006). 
To qualify for Medicaid, people with home equity in excess of the threshold could use a 
reverse mortgage or home equity loan to reduce their equity interest. STONE, supra 
note 23, at 8. See generally FROLIK, supra note 1, at 101-05 (addressing specifically 
nursing home private-pay methods that utilize home equity). 
67. STONE, supra note 23, at 7. 
68. FROLIK, supra note 1, at 133.  Medicaid has special eligibility requirements for 
married individuals that aim to protect the economic independence of the “community 
spouse” (the spouse not living in a nursing home). For a more detailed discussion on 
the protections provided to the “community spouse,” see id. at 135-42; see also STONE, 
supra note 23, at 9-10 (discussing the Medicare Catastrophic Coverage Act (MCCA) of 
1998, which established new rules allowing the community spouse to retain higher 
amounts of assets and income than the federal law allows); State Information, supra 
note 41. 
69. FROLIK, supra note 1, at 142 (underscoring the need for proper planning by 
noting that some spend-down attempts may render the individual ineligible for bene­
fits); see also 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(c); STONE, supra note 23, at 2. 
70. STONE, supra note 23, at 2; see, e.g., Rainey v. Guardianship of Mackey, 773 
So.2d 118, 118 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000) (noting that the ward had about “$78,725 in 
assets, a monthly income of $980.97, and a monthly deficit of $4,377.78” and “[h]er 
guardians . . . alleged that [the ward] would deplete all of her assets to pay for her 
nursing expenses in 10.64 months”); In re Guardianship of Domey, 960 A.2d 729, 731­
32 (N.H. 2008) (noting that in December 2003 the ward had over $730,000 in assets with 
a monthly income of about $5,700, but the costs of the ward’s care quickly depleted his 
assets and he qualified for Medicaid in January 2006); In re Keri, 853 A.2d 909, 911-12 
(N.J. 2004) (noting that the ward’s “monthly nursing home expenses [were] $6,500”); In 
re Labis, 714 A.2d 335, 336 (N.J. 1998) (noting that while the ward “was treated at the 
Morris Hills Multicare Center” the cost of care was “$10,000 per month”); In re Shah, 
694 N.Y.S.2d 82, 83 (App. Div. 1999) (noting that Shah’s hospital “care amounts to over 
$1,000 per day” and a private pay rate “of $1,608.13 per day”); In re John, 652 N.Y.S.2d 
329, 330 (App. Div. 1996) (approving a proposed Medicaid spend-down which left the 
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a “pool of funds” to pay for nursing home care, the opportunity to 
pass on the life savings or home to his or her heirs is lost.71  Some 
critics may contend that this “is not a problem of affordable long-
term care, but rather a failure or inability of the older person to 
save enough to pay for life’s vicissitudes and still have an estate to 
leave to the heirs.”72  Yet, Medicaid planning has quickly become a 
subset of estate planning that allows individuals to legally divest 
themselves of their wealth to qualify for Medicaid earlier than they 
otherwise would if those assets were used to pay for their care.73 
When individuals make gifts (one Medicaid planning tech-
nique),74 they may incur a period of Medicaid ineligibility known as 
a “penalty period,”75 the length of which varies based on the 
amount of assets “improperly transferred” divided by the average 
monthly cost of nursing home care in the state.76  “Under [the] cur­
rent law, the look-back date is five years prior to [the] application 
(approximately $33,000)” which was enough to cover ward’s nursing home costs for 
only 36 months). 
71. FROLIK, supra note 1, at 95. 
72. Id. 
73. STONE, supra note 23, at 2; FROLIK, supra note 1, at 142. See generally Medi­
caid Rules, supra note 23 (answering whether transferring assets is legal). 
74. See infra Part II.B. 
75. 42 U.S.C. § 1396p (2006); see also STONE, supra note 23, at 10; FROLIK, supra 
note 1, at 142-45; Donald D. Vanarelli, Financial Exploitation of the Elderly: Impact on 
Medicaid Eligibility, 6 NAT’L ACAD. ELDER L. ATT’Y J. 39, 40 (2010). 
76. The author uses the term “improperly transferred” to define those asset trans­
fers incurring a penalty period, and one example of an improper transfer is a gift (an 
asset transferred for less than fair market value). See 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(c)(1)(A) 
(2006) (stating that penalty periods are incurred for transferring assets for less than fair 
market value, which is an improper transfer); 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(c)(E)(i) (2006) (defin­
ing calculations for the penalty period); STONE, supra note 23, at 10 n.23; FROLIK, supra 
note 1, at 142-43 (noting that “[t]he number of months [of the penalty period] is deter­
mined by dividing the total . . . uncompensated value of all assets transferred (e.g. gifts), 
on or after the look-back date by the average monthly cost . . . of a nursing facility in 
the state . . . at the time of application”); see, e.g., Makepeace v. Dougherty, No. 10­
10266-RWZ, 2010 WL 4180575, at *1 (Mass. Dist. Ct. 2010) (noting that Makepeace’s 
Medicaid application was not approved because “he made a $11,005 disqualifying trans­
fer of funds resulting in a 43-day penalty period of ineligibility”); V.S. v. Div. of Med. 
Assistance & Health Serv., 2010 WL 1658592, at *3 n.1 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2010) 
(imposing a 23 month and 14 day ineligibility period after the Medicaid applicant trans­
ferred her home to her son); Talarico v. Dept. of Human Serv., 2009 WL 88118, at *1 
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2009) (noting that Talarico made a $5,000 transfer from his 
bank account to another’s and consequently incurred a one-month period of ineligibil­
ity); Lancashire Hall Nursing & Rehab. Ctr. v. Dep’t of Pub. Welfare, 995 A.2d 540, 541 
(Pa. Commw. Ct. 2010) (affirming the imposition of a 415 day penalty period of long-
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[for] Medicaid,”77 and whether individuals incur a penalty depends 
on whether they made a gift of an asset on or after the look-back 
period.78  Currently, those applying for “Medicaid nursing home 
benefits” care must disclose any gifts made within the five years 
preceding the application.79 
Once an individual incurs a penalty period, it begins to run on 
the later of “the first day of the month during or after which the 
assets [were gifted], or the date on which the individual is eligible 
for Medicaid and would otherwise be receiving [nursing home 
care].”80  Furthermore, subsequent gifts will extend the penalty pe­
riod because the value of the gifts are combined and treated as if 
the aggregate value were initially gifted.81 
B. Medicaid Planning: Strategies and Important Considerations 
Because individuals will likely incur a penalty period for gifts 
transferred within the look-back period, it is important that they 
consider a strategy for, and the consequences of, transferring assets 
77. STONE, supra note 23, at 10; see 42 U.S.C. § 1396p (2006).  Under the prior 
law the look-back period was 36 months and 60 months for some trusts. STONE, supra 
note 23, at 10 n.22; see, e.g., Zander v. Adams, 928 N.E.2d 492, 502-03 (Ill. App. Ct. 
2010) (finding that because Zander applied for Medicaid only 37 months after transfer­
ring assets from a trust, a period of ineligibility must be imposed because the transfer of 
assets is subject to a 60 month look-back period); In re Sandra, 818 N.Y.S.2d 439, 440 
(App. Div. 2006) (noting that the new Medicaid laws changed the look-back period 
from 36 months to 60 months); see also Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993 
(OBRA), Pub. L. No. 103-66, 107 Stat. 312 (1993). But see V.S., 2010 WL 1658592, at 
*3 n.1 (noting that while the DRA extended the look-back period, most counties still 
apply the 36 month look-back period, and it is anticipated that all New Jersey counties 
will begin applying the 60 month look-back period in 2011). 
78. STONE, supra note 23, at 10.  There are some exceptions to the general rule 
that a gift triggers a penalty period. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(c)(1)(B) (2006) (pro­
viding that transfers of exempt assets do not trigger a penalty period); 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1396p(c)(2) (2006) (listing specific transfers that do not incur a penalty period such as: 
transfers that would cause undue hardship; transfers that were intended to be disposed 
of at fair market value; or transfers to trusts meeting statutory criteria); 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1396p(c)(2)(A) (2006) (listing specific situations in which transfer of a house does not 
invoke a penalty period); FROLIK, supra note 1, at 146 (citing specific examples of ex­
empt transfers such as: gifts to a spouse or disabled child; when denying eligibility 
would cause undue hardship; or the transfer of the applicant’s home if it meets the 
statutory conditions). 
79. FROLIK, supra note 1, at 142; see also 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(c)(1)(B). 
80. STONE, supra note 23, at 10.  Prior to the Deficit Reduction Act (DRA), the 
period of ineligibility began to run during the month when the assets were transferred 
or, if the state chose, in the month following the transfer. Id. at 10 n.24; see also 42 
U.S.C. § 1396p(c)(1)(B). 
81. 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(c)(1)(E) (providing that ineligibility is determined by the 
total cumulative value of uncompensated transfers); STONE, supra note 23, at 10 n.23; 
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for Medicaid eligibility.82  “[T]he goals are twofold: first, to pre­
serve assets in order to supplement Medicaid and thereby maintain 
the elder person’s quality of life until the very end, and, second, to 
assure that the person’s life savings are passed on to loved ones 
rather than consumed by long-term health care costs.”83  A com­
mon Medicaid planning technique is to transfer a portion of a per­
son’s assets, while retaining a portion that will satisfy the costs of 
nursing home care during the penalty period incurred as a result of 
the transfer.84  Individuals may also look to long-term care insur­
ance to cover some of the costs incurred during the penalty pe­
riod.85  If gifting the property, individuals must also consider 
consequences that affect themselves or third parties. For example, 
having a child hold assets in the Medicaid applicant’s name could 
jeopardize the ability of the applicant’s grandchildren to qualify for 
college financial aid.86  Furthermore, even in a stable family, some 
family members may prove unwilling or unable to hold the gifted 
funds for the applicant’s benefit.87 
Another useful strategy for protecting savings is to convert 
countable assets into non-countable assets.88  In this case, individu­
als spend down assets used to determine eligibility on non-counta­
ble assets, which, are not considered when determining Medicaid 
82. See FROLIK, supra note 1, at 142-54; Joan M. Krauskopf et al., Elderlaw: Ad­
vocacy for the Aging, 1 ELDERLAW ADVOC. AGING § 11:41 (Nov. 2009); Medicaid Plan­
ning, ELDER L. ANSWERS, http://www.elderlawanswers.com/elder_info/elder_article. 
asp?id=701 (last visited Apr. 15, 2012) [hereinafter Medicaid Planning] (outlining strat­
egy and techniques for Medicaid planning and potential consequences).  Because every 
state has discretion in determining eligibility within the federal parameters, Medicaid 
planning strategies differ in every state. See, e.g., Margaret H. Kreiner, Basic Medicaid 
Strategies, OHIO  ELDER L. § 8:10 (2009); Jennifer H. Leibson & Bernard M. Faller, 
Medicaid Planning, 23 KY. PRAC. KY. ELDER L. § 9:12 (2010); Vincent J. Russo & 
Marvin Rachlin, Medicaid Planning: Transfer of Assets, N.Y. ELDER L. PRAC. § 15:11 
(May 2010) (discussing the role of attorneys and relevant strategies for Medicaid 
planning). 
83. John A. Miller, Voluntary Impoverishment to Obtain Government Benefits, 13 
CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 81, 92 (2003). 
84. Krauskopf et al., supra note 82, § 11:41. 
85. See supra notes 47-52 and accompanying text, which discuss the cost-benefit 
analysis an individual must make before purchasing long-term care insurance. See also 
FROLIK, supra note 1, at 118 (noting that some individuals take out long-term care 
insurance that pays benefits to cover any penalty period incurred due to disqualifying 
gifts). 
86. Medicaid Planning, supra note 82. 
87. See generally id. (noting that once an applicant divests himself of the asset, he 
loses ownership, and that asset is now owned by the donee who may lose it to bank­
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265 2012] MEDICAID PLANNING AND DUTIES OF GUARDIANS 
eligibility.89  “For example, money in checking or savings accounts 
may be used, without creating a period of ineligibility, to purchase 
or improve a home, pay off a mortgage, buy a cemetery lot, [or] 
pre-pay funeral services . . . .”90  These expenditures are examples 
of non-countable assets that will not be considered part of an indi­
vidual’s assets when determining his or her Medicaid eligibility. 
The laws of Medicaid are complex, and the transfer of assets re­
quires consideration of many factors, so it is recommended that in­
dividuals consult with an attorney before executing any transfers in 
pursuit of Medicaid eligibility.91 
C. Reducing Medicaid Costs by Discouraging Medicaid Planning 
More and more middle-class and wealthier individuals are us­
ing Medicaid to pay for nursing home care,92 and “[a]s a result, 
Medicaid expenditures [have] soared.”93  Recognizing the appeal of 
transferring wealth to “create Medicaid eligibility,” Congress has 
reacted by enacting several rules that make donors of these gifts 
ineligible for Medicaid.94  The Deficit Reduction Act (DRA) of 
2005 was Congress’s most recent attempt to curb Medicaid plan­
ning; the Act made a number of changes to the rules concerning 
asset transfers to ensure that Medicaid applicants apply their assets 
89. Id. 
90. Hal Fliegelman & Debora C. Fliegelman, Giving Guardians the Power to do 
Medicaid Planning, 32 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 341, 363 (1997); see 20 C.F.R. § 416.1210 
(2010) (listing assets that are excluded when determining Medicaid eligibility). 
91. Krauskopf et al., supra note 82, § 11:41; Medicaid Planning, supra note 82. 
92. SADLER, supra note 24, at 80. 
93. Id. 
94. FROLIK, supra note 1, at 142.  The DRA is not Congress’s first attempt to 
discourage Medicaid planning.  The court in Miller, when considering whether to ap­
prove a Medicaid spend-down, gave great deference to a 1986 amendment to the fed­
eral Medicaid laws that rendered certain trusts (previously considered a non-countable 
asset) an available asset for determining Medicaid eligibility. The court noted that this 
amendment was consistent with the Congressional intent that Medicaid is designed to 
provide benefits to those who are truly needy.  Miller v. State Dep’t of Soc. & Rehab. 
Serv., 64 P.3d 395, 401-02 (Kan. 2003). 
Moreover, OBRA of 1993 was another attempt by Congress to “restrict access to 
Medicaid’s long-term care services to those . . . who are poor or . . . have very high 
medical or long-term care expenses” by establishing stricter asset transfer rules. STONE, 
supra note 23, at 2.  OBRA 1993 required the transfer of assets to occur 36 months 
prior to applying for Medicaid and required the states to enact legislation concerning 
estate recovery. Id. at 10 n.22; see also supra note 77 (noting that look-back period 
under OBRA was 36 months). See generally SADLER, supra note 24, at 80-81 (provid­
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toward the cost of their care.95  First, the DRA lengthened the 
look-back period for all income and asset transfers from 36 months 
to 60 months.96  Additionally, the DRA changed the start date of 
the penalty period to “[i]ncrease[ ] the probability that penalties ap­
plied will actually be experienced by applicants,”97 and enabled 
states to calculate the penalty period by treating the cumulative 
value of assets transferred by an individual as one transfer.98  Over­
all, these measures aim to impose stricter penalties on persons who 
make multiple transfers; essentially, periods of ineligibility now run 
consecutively rather than concurrently.99 
Even though the DRA does not completely prohibit Medicaid 
planning, it is clear that the legislative intent is to discourage indi­
viduals from engaging in such planning as it diverts scarce resources 
away from those who are truly in need to pay for care of people 
who are less in need.100  Critics of Medicaid planning also argue 
95. STONE, supra note 23, at 10, 29. See generally Summary of the New Medicaid 
Rules (the DRA), ELDER L. ANSWERS, http://www.elderlawanswers.com/Elder_Info/ 
Elder_Article.asp?id=2751#9 (last visited Apr. 15, 2012); Transfer of Assets, CTR. FOR 
MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERV., (June 29, 2010, 6:41 A.M.), http://www.cms.gov/Medi­
caidEligibility/10_TransferofAssets.asp#TopOfPage (providing basic information about 
how the DRA affects Medicaid planning). 
96. 42 U.S.C. § 1396p (2006); STONE, supra note 23, at 10 n.22.  See supra note 94 
for more information on the prior look-back period, which discusses OBRA. 
97. STONE, supra note 23, at 29. 
98. Id. at 29-30; see also supra note 81 (for further information on accumulation 
of assets transferred). 
99. STONE, supra note 23, at 30; Krauskopf et al., supra note 82, § 11:41 (noting 
that the prior law did not trigger new penalty periods for subsequent transfers). The 
DRA made other changes that significantly impacted the asset transfer and eligibility 
rules.  Addressing each of these changes is outside of the scope of this Note. See gener­
ally FROLIK, supra note 1 (discussing further information on the treatment of: trusts; 
annuities; notes and loans; home equity; life estates; continuing care retirement commu­
nities; the income first rule for community spouses); STONE, supra note 23. 
100. STONE, supra note 23, at 2; see Striegel v. South Dakota Dep’t of Soc. Serv., 
515 N.W.2d 245, 247-48 (S.D. 1994) (holding that “[t]he Medicaid program is not to be 
used as an estate planning tool” and allowing “[the ward] to receive Medicaid benefits 
while tens of thousands of dollars are sheltered in a trust violates the spirit and intent of 
the Medicaid program and is unjust to those who do not have access to the supplemen­
tal funds yet desperately need the benefits”); see also Zander v. Adams, 928 N.E.2d 492, 
495-97 (Ill. App. Ct. 2010); Miller v. State Dep’t of Soc. & Rehab. Serv., 64 P.3d 395, 
401 (Kan.2003); Lebow v. Comm’r of Div. Med. Assistance, 740 N.E.2d 978, 980 (Mass. 
2001); In re Rosckes, 783 N.W.2d 220, 225 (Minn. Ct. App. 2010) (noting that Congres­
sional intent indicates that Medicaid is intended to be the payor of last resort limited to 
the financially needy, and individuals are expected to use their assets to pay for their 
care rather than engaging in Medicaid planning). See generally Karla Levinson, Com­
ment, Long-Term Care Alert: An Analysis of Delaware’s Approach to Medicaid Plan­
ning Techniques and Why Curbing Medicaid Planning Will Not Solve the Nation’s 
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267 2012] MEDICAID PLANNING AND DUTIES OF GUARDIANS 
that it shifts the financial burden from those individuals capable of 
paying for their care to the Medicaid program.  Essentially, “people 
should assume financial responsibility . . . before relying on tax dol­
lars to pay for care they could otherwise afford.”101  Congress de­
termined that “cutting benefit packages, eligibility, or 
reimbursement[s] . . . to providers” were not desirable outcomes.102 
Instead, discouraging Medicaid planning and restricting eligibility 
to those who are truly needy better accomplishes Congress’s goal of 
preserving Medicaid benefits for the neediest persons.103 
By contrast, others contend that Medicaid planning is an essen­
tial tool for individuals who wish to protect their assets.104  The pro­
ponents note that although the DRA discourages Medicaid 
planning, it does not completely prohibit individuals from engaging 
in such planning.105  They further argue that individuals should 
have the absolute power to do whatever they want with their assets, 
and this includes giving them away.106  In fact, the government has 
no right to complain when middle class individuals, faced with des­
perate circumstances, intentionally impoverish themselves because 
the government “established the rule that poverty is a prerequisite 
to [receiving] government assistance [to] defray[ ] . . . the costs of 
ruinously expensive, but absolutely essential, medical treat­
ment.”107  “Few would suggest that it is improper for taxpayers to 
maximize their deductions under our tax laws to preserve income 
for themselves and their families—even though they are . . . reduc­
Don’t Plan on Aging: The Kansas Supreme Court Reaffirms its Hostility Toward Medi­
caid Planning, 45 WASHBURN L.J. 491 (2006) (evaluating Delaware’s and Kansas’s ap­
proaches, respectively, aiming to curb Medicaid planning). 
101. STONE, supra note 23, at 2; see also supra note 100 (noting that this concept 
is consistent with Medicaid being the payor of last resort). 
102. STONE, supra note 23, at 22. 
103. Id. 
104. Id.; see also H.K. v. State, 877 A.2d 1218 (N.J. 2005); In re Keri, 853 A.2d 
909 (N.J. 2004); In re Shah, 733 N.E.2d 1093, 1098-99 (N.Y. 2000) (determining that 
Medicaid planning is permissible under the current Medicaid laws and reasonable indi­
viduals aim to preserve assets for themselves and their families); In re Daniels, 618 
N.Y.S.2d 499, 500 (Sup. Ct. 1994). 
105. Keri, 853 A.2d at 920 (noting that “Medicaid planning is legally permissi­
ble”); see In re John, 652 N.Y.S.2d 329 (App. Div. 1996). Although this case was de­
cided before the DRA was enacted, the court’s point is still applicable today. The court 
noted that “Medicaid . . . was not designed to provide medical benefits to those who 
[purposely] render themselves ‘needy’,” but “the simple fact is that the current law 
rewards prudent ‘Medicaid planning.’” Id. at 331-32; see also supra note 82 (providing 
strategies for Medicaid planning post-DRA). 
106. Shah, 733 N.E.2d at 1101 (citing the lower court’s opinion in In re Shah, 694 
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ing . . . money available to [the] government for its public pur­
poses.”108  Similarly, Medicaid planning allows individuals to 
protect their assets from depletion and then distribute them in ac­
cordance with their wishes.109 
Typically, individuals “feel they should be able to leave their 
estates to their loved ones.”110  Supporters of Medicaid planning 
also argue that the low asset thresholds require people to become 
penniless before they can qualify for assistance, thus leaving them 
without the resources they need.111  The final argument in support 
of Medicaid planning is that the cuts to Medicaid under the DRA 
were misguided, as “planning was not a large contributor toward 
Medicaid’s financial strain.”112  Though the critics of Medicaid plan­
ning argue that spend-downs should be discouraged, the fact re­
mains that Medicaid planning is not entirely foreclosed to 
individuals wishing to engage in it. 
D. Guardians and Medicaid Planning 
While Medicaid planning itself is a controversial subject, Medi­
caid planning initiated and executed by guardians on behalf of their 
wards who require nursing home care is even more contested. The 
law presumes that adults possess mental capacity, which is defined 
as being “capable of making rational decisions and [being] best situ­
ated [to do so on one’s] own behalf.113  An individual’s autonomy 
and independence are founded on the absolute right to make 
108. Keri, 853 A.2d at 920 (contending that Medicaid planning is the analog to 
estate planning, which is common and acceptable); In In re Trott, the court held that 
courts may authorize the transfer of a ward’s property to minimize estate taxes and fees 
in accord with the following courts: 
Accord: In re DuPont, . . . 194 A.2d 309 (Ch.1963); In re Morris, 281 A.2d 156 
(N.H.Sup.Ct.1971); In re Carson, . . . 241 N.Y.S.2d 288 (Sup.Ct.1962); In re 
Groff Estate, 38 Pa.Dist.C.R.2d 556 (1965). Cf. In re Johnson, . . . 162 A.96 
(Ch.1932); In re Brice’s Guardianship, 233 Iowa 183, 8 N.W.2d 576 
(Sup.Ct.1943); In re Buckley’s Estate, 330 Mich. 102, 47 N.W.2d 33 
(Sup.Ct.1951); In re Trusteeship of Kenan, 262 N.C. 627, 138 S.E.2d 547 
(Sup.Ct.1964). Contra: In re Neal, 406 S.W.2d 496 (Tex.Civ.App.1966). 
In re Trott, 288 A.2d 303, 306 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1972); see also Fliegelman & 
Fliegelman, supra note 90, at 368 (noting that Medicaid planning should be allowed like 
other tax and estate planning). 
109. Keri, 853 A.2d at 920. 
110. STONE, supra note 23, at 3. 
111. Id. But see FROLIK, supra note 1, at 95 (noting that this is not a problem 
concerning health care costs or Medicaid eligibility but is really a failure of individuals 
to save enough money to pay for their care). 
112. STONE, supra note 23, at 22. 
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269 2012] MEDICAID PLANNING AND DUTIES OF GUARDIANS 
choices regarding “his or her property or person.”114  For those who 
are incapacitated,115 a guardian may be appointed as a “substitute 
decision maker”;116 legally, the decisions of the guardian are 
treated as if they were made by the ward.117  Without a guardian, 
the incapacitated persons would reside in a “legal limbo” because 
they are unable to make decisions for themselves.118  Appointment 
of a guardian ensures that the incapacitated person is fully able to 
participate in life.119 
When appointing a guardian, professional guardians are distin­
guished from nonprofessional guardians.  Generally, the former is 
required to meet age, experience, education, and character require­
ments,120 while the latter is a friend or family member of the 
114. Id. 
115. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 5-102(4) (2006) defines “[i]ncapacitated person” as 
“an individual who, for reasons other than being a minor, . . . lacks the ability to meet 
essential requirements for physical health, safety, or self-care, even with appropriate 
technological assistance.”  Discussing the various standards for determining incapacity 
is beyond the scope of this Note. See also FROLIK, supra note 1, at 160-63 (discussing 
more specifically the various definitions and approaches for determining whether an 
individual is incapacitated). 
116. FROLIK, supra note 1, at 156.  Each state has its own laws that provide proce­
dures empowering the courts to appoint guardians. Id.; see also Fliegelman & 
Fliegelman, supra note 90, at 343 (explaining that each state’s “definitions, procedures, 
and requirements” vary a great deal, but that each “state requires some [form] of peti­
tion, notice, and judicial consideration”). See generally 39 AM. JUR. 2D Guardian & 
Ward §§ 1-220 (2008) (discussing guardian ward jurisprudence). 
117. FROLIK, supra note 1, at 156; see Romo v. Kirschner, 889 P.2d 32, 34 (Ariz. 
Ct. App. 1995) (holding that the trust created by a conservator on behalf of the ward 
was “[i]n reality . . . created by [the ward]”); Forsyth v. Rowe, 629 A.2d 379, 382-84 
(Conn. 1993) (holding that the Medicaid qualifying trust established by the ward’s con­
servator was in fact established by the ward as the ward provided all of the considera­
tion); Williams v. Kansas Dep’t of Soc. & Rehab. Servs., 899 P.2d 452, 456 (Kan. 1995) 
(holding that for purposes of determining whether a trust is a Medicaid qualifying trust, 
“implicit in the term ‘individual’ is a person acting as an individual’s legal representa­
tive where the individual is incapable of acting on his or her own”). 
“Guardianship is the legal process of providing a substitute decision maker for a 
mentally incapacitated individual.” FROLIK, supra note 1, at 159.  This Note aims only 
to provide a general understanding of the guardian-ward relationship, and specific dis­
cussion of guardianship is beyond the scope of this Note. See generally id. at 155-213; 
Fliegelman & Fliegelman, supra note 90 (providing an in depth discussion on the his­
tory of guardianships, guardian duties and powers, and the implications of guardian 
appointment for a ward). 
118. FROLIK, supra note 1, at 156. 
119. Id. 
120. E.g., ALASKA STAT. § 08.26.020 (2010) (requiring a minimum age, casework 
experience, education standard, certification, and criminal background checks); TEX. 
PROB. CODE  ANN. § 697 (West 2010) (requiring a statement providing educational 
background, professional experience, references, information regarding value of assets 
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ward.121  To alleviate the knowledge and experience disparity be­
tween professional and nonprofessional guardians, a nonprofes­
sional guardian may be required to take an educational course 
discussing the powers and duties of the position.122  Although a pro­
fessional guardian, due to greater education and experience, is 
likely more familiar with guardian powers and duties, courts usually 
express a tendency to appoint nonprofessional guardians.123  Once 
a guardian is appointed he or she is charged with making the best 
decisions on behalf of the ward.124 
Whether a guardian may engage in Medicaid planning on be­
half of the ward depends upon the state law.125  Currently, every 
state has a statute that contemplates guardian capabilities for en­
gaging in estate planning and gifting.126  Whether the guardian may 
actually engage in this planning depends on how the court exercises 
its discretion and interprets the statute, and whether the court au­
thorizes the guardian’s proposed spend-down.127  Several states list 
121. See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 11.88.008 (West 2011) (defining professional 
guardian as someone “who is not a member of the incapacitated person’s family and 
who charges fees for carrying out [their] duties” (emphasis added)). The negative im­
plication of this definition is that nonprofessional guardians include family members 
who do not charge fees and do not meet professional licensing requirements. See supra 
note 120. 
122. E.g., CAL. PROB. CODE § 1457 (West 2012); FLA. STAT. ANN. 
§ 744.3145(c)(4) (West 2010); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 44A-1-10 (LexisNexis 2010). 
123. In re Joshua H., 880 N.Y.S.2d 645, 646 (App. Div. 2009) (holding that “[t]he 
appointment of a family member is preferable, but if a suitable family member is not 
available, it is within the court’s discretion to appoint an outsider”) (ciations omitted); 
In re Hancock, 828 S.W.2d 707, 709 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992) (holding that relatives are 
preferred appointees, but that the court reserves discretion to appoint a professional 
fiduciary). 
124. See supra note 117 (noting that the powers of each guardianship and 
whether the guardian’s acts are permissible vary with the type of guardianship and the 
applicable state laws). 
125. FROLIK, supra note 1, at 167. 
126. See infra Appendix (providing the statutes and principal cases for each 
state); see, e.g., Rainey v. Guardianship of Mackey, 773 So.2d 118, 119-20 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 2000); In re Keri, 853 A.2d 909, 916 (N.J. 2004); In re John XX, 652 N.Y.S.2d 329, 
332 (App. Div. 1996) (holding that incapacitated persons have the same rights as those 
who are competent to engage in Medicaid planning through their guardian). But see In 
re Guardianship of Domey, 960 A.2d 729, 732 (N.H. 2008) (finding that the trial court 
erred in “ruling that the [guardians] had a fiduciary duty to impoverish the ward in 
order to qualify him for Medicaid so that his assets could be protected for his spouse”). 
See generally Fliegelman & Fliegelman, supra note 90. 
127. See, e.g., Keri, 853 A.2d at 920; Shah, 733 N.E.2d at 1098-99; John, 652 
N.Y.S.2d 329, 331-332 (holding specifically that guardians may engage in Medicaid 
spend downs); see also In re Guardianship of Christiansen, 56 Cal. Rptr. 505, 522-23 
(Cal. Ct. App. 1967); In re Estate of Berger, 520 N.E.2d 690, 705 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987) 
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271 2012] MEDICAID PLANNING AND DUTIES OF GUARDIANS 
factors to be considered within the statutes,128 while other states 
have incorporated a range of factors through their common law.129 
Some of the more common factors the courts consider before ap­
proving a spend-down include: the permanency of the ward’s condi­
tion; whether the remaining assets will meet the needs of the ward 
and his dependents (if any); whether a reasonable person under the 
circumstances would have made the transfer;130 who is receiving the 
property; whether the transfer will benefit the estate; the size of the 
estate; and past gifts, donative intent, or prior estate planning.131 
Once a state allows Medicaid planning by guardians, each state adopts a doctrine that 
determines the permissibility of such planning. See Fliegelman & Fliegelman, supra 
note 90, at 349-53 (enumerating and explaining guardianship standards: continuing pat­
tern, best interests, and substituted judgment). 
128. See CAL. PROB. CODE §§ 2580-86 (2002); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 464-A:26­
a (2004); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 3B:12-50, -58 (West 2007); N.Y. MENTAL  HYG. LAW 
§ 81.21 (McKinney 2006). See generally infra Appendix. 
129. See In re Guardianship of Bohac, 380 So.2d 550, 552-53 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
1980) (incorporating several factors enumerated in Christiansen, 56 Cal. Rptr. at 523­
25); Keri, 853 A.2d at 913 (adopting the factors enumerated in Trott); see also Christian­
sen, 56 Cal. Rptr. at 523-25 (providing factors the court must consider before allowing a 
guardian to divest a ward of his assets, which were later codified in California Probate 
Code 2580-86). 
130. The doctrine of substituted judgment provides courts with the authority to 
permit a guardian’s transfer of the ward’s property so long as the transfer would have 
been made by either: the ward, if competent, or a reasonably prudent person in the 
ward’s position. 
Christiansen v. Christiansen (In re Guardianship of Christiansen), 56 Cal. 
Rptr. 505, 524 (Ct. App. 1967) (stating that the court must determine whether 
the incompetent as a reasonably prudent person would make proposed gifts); 
Strange v. Powers, 260 N.E.2d 704, 708-09 (Mass. 1970) (stating that courts 
have power to authorize transfers of incompetent’s property where it appears 
that incompetent, if sane, would have made the transfers as a reasonably pru­
dent person); In re Morris, 281 A.2d 156, 158 (N.H. 1971) (stating that guard­
ian is authorized to act as a reasonable and prudent person would act under 
same circumstances); In re Baird, 634 N.Y.S.2d 971, 975 (Sup. Ct. 1995) (find­
ing that a competent, reasonable person in the position of the incompetent 
individual would be likely to make same renunciation of inheritance proposed 
by guardian); In re Parnes, N.Y.L.J., Apr. 7, 1995, at 33 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Apr. 7, 
1995) (stating that court must determine whether ward would have transferred 
own assets if ward had capacity to act); In re Daniels, 618 N.Y.S.2d 499, 504 
(Sup. Ct. 1994) ([I]t is the Court’s conclusion that a competent, reasonable 
individual in the position of the [disabled individual] would be likely to make 
the proposed transfer . . . .”); In re Florence, 530 N.Y.S.2d 981, 982 (Sur. Ct. 
1988) (stating that guardian or court has the power to gift ward’s property 
provided that the ward “would be likely to make such a transfer, if capable of 
doing so”). 
Fliegelman & Fliegelman, supra note 90, at 370 & n.183. 
131. CAL. PROB. CODE §§ 2580-86 (West 2002); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 744.441 (West 
2010); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 464-A:26-a (2004); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 3B:12-50 to -58 
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272 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:251 
Because courts must examine various factors before authoriz­
ing guardian-initiated transfers, each proposed spend-down is de­
cided on a case-by-case basis.132  Although the states consider many 
of the same factors when making their decisions, the outcomes vary 
greatly.  For example, both New Jersey and New York have 
adopted presumptions in favor of allowing guardian-initiated Medi­
caid planning.133  The primary argument for allowing a guardian to 
engage in Medicaid planning rests on the premise that guardians 
typically may engage in other estate planning on behalf of their 
wards.134  In line with this contention, the court in In re Keri noted 
that it is not “improper for taxpayers to maximize their deductions 
under our tax laws to preserve income for themselves and their 
families.”135  Similarly, the court in In re Shah noted that “any per­
son . . . would prefer that the costs of his care be paid by the State, 
as opposed to his family.”136  These courts recognize that individu­
als prefer their assets be left to loved ones, rather than spending the 
assets on the costs of nursing home care.  However, the more per­
suasive argument rests on the policies of fairness and equal protec­
tion.137  Specifically, the court in Keri held that “[s]o long as the law 
note that the factors provided are illustrative and not exhaustive. See generally infra 
Appendix (providing each state’s statute and cases enumerating the factors that need to 
be considered). 
132. See generally RICHARD A. POSNER, THE  PROBLEMS OF  JURISPRUDENCE 
(1990); C. Edward Galfand, Heeding the Call for a Predictable Rule of Origin, 11 U. PA. 
J. INT’L  BUS. L. 469, 488-89 (1989) (discussing the benefits and costs of case-by-case 
analysis, specifically noting the efficiency and clarity of bright-line rules as compared to 
decreased predictability, but increased flexibility of case-by-case analysis). 
133. Supra note 17 and accompanying text; accord Keri, 853 A.2d at 916-17 
(quoting Shah, 733 N.E.2d at 1099) (declining to impose a duty, but establishing a pre­
sumption in favor of spend-downs on “ground[s] that a reasonable and competent per­
son ‘would prefer that the costs of his care be paid by the State, as opposed to his 
family’”). 
134. See, e.g., In re Guardianship of Christiansen, 56 Cal. Rptr. 505, 522-23 (Cal. 
Ct. App. 1967); In re Bohac, 380 So.2d 550, 552-53 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980); Strange v. 
Powers, 260 N.E.2d 704, 709-10 (Mass. 1970); In re Morris, 281 A.2d 156, 158 (N.H. 
1971) (holding that a guardian may engage in prudent estate planning on behalf of his 
ward); see also Keri, 853 A.2d at 920 (N.J. 2004) (noting specifically that individuals 
engage in tax planning to minimize their tax consequence thereby preserving their as­
sets); Jason A. Frank, The Necessity of Medicaid Planning, 30 U. BALT. L.F. 29, 38-39 
(1999) (comparing Medicaid planning to tax planning); Matthew Wilson, The Future of 
Medicaid Planning in Missouri, 62 J. MO. B. 62, 70 (2006) (comparing Medicaid plan­
ning to tax planning). 
135. Keri, 853 A.2d at 920. 
136. Shah, 733 N.E. 2d at 1099 (emphasis added) (quoting In re Shah 694 
N.Y.S.2d 82, 87 (App. Div. 1999)). 
137. Strange, 260 N.E.2d at 709-10; Keri, 853 A.2d at 920; In re Daniels, 618 
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273 2012] MEDICAID PLANNING AND DUTIES OF GUARDIANS 
allows competent persons to engage in Medicaid planning, incom­
petent persons, through their guardians, should have the same 
right.”138 
On the other hand, several states tend to examine the factors in 
a manner that leans against Medicaid planning by guardians.139 
The most persuasive argument for limiting guardian-initiated Medi­
caid planning is that the guardian has a duty to protect and preserve 
the ward’s estate in order to use those assets for the ward’s care.140 
In Domey, the court disagreed with the ward’s spouse, who argued 
that the ward’s guardians had a duty to engage in Medicaid plan­
ning so the ward’s assets could be used for her support.141  The 
court held that “[t]he primary duty of the guardian is to protect the 
estate’s assets [and] to apply them for the support and care of the 
ward.”142  The court reached this decision by narrowly interpreting 
the guardianship statute and concluding that “its primary objective 
is to protect the well-being of the ward.”143 
Similarly, in In re Adler, the court held that the guardian’s pro­
posed Medicaid plan, which did not benefit the ward, contravened 
the guardian’s duty to protect and preserve the ward’s assets for her 
own enjoyment.144  This contention is in line with the policy that 
Medicaid be the payor of last resort, and individuals who can fi­
nance their own care should not shelter their assets merely to qual­
ify for Medicaid sooner than they otherwise would.145 
Consequently, these states are more hesitant to allow guardian-ini­
tiated Medicaid planning. 
In fact, California courts have held, pursuant to the California 
Probate Code, “that [a] conservator is not required to propose any 
action under [S]ection 2580” such as making gifts or engaging in 
a ward’s assets is denying the ward an opportunity available to all competent persons); 
see also supra note 126 (citing other cases holding that individuals with guardians 
should be afforded the same ability to engage in planning as competent individuals). 
138. Keri, 853 A.2d at 920. 
139. See, e.g., In re Guardianship of Domey, 960 A.2d 729, 733 (N.H. 2008); In re 
Adler, No. 1144IC, 2003 WL 22053309, at *3 (Pa. Com. Pl. 2003) (holding that the 
guardian has a duty to protect the ward’s assets and apply them to the ward’s care). 
140. Supra note 139 (noting that the guardian has a duty to apply the ward’s 
assets for the ward’s care). 
141. Domey, 960 A.2d at 732. 
142. Id. at 733. 
143. Id.; see also N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 464-A:26-a (2004). 
144. Adler, 2003 WL 22053309, at *6. 
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planning that would benefit the estate.146  Rather than require the 
conservator to initiate such action on behalf of the ward, the court 
held that the remedy is for an “interested person”147 “to petition 
[the court] under Section 2580 for an order requiring the conserva­
tor to take such action with respect to estate planning or making 
gifts.”148 
New Hampshire, like California, also takes a more restrictive 
approach when determining guardian duties for Medicaid planning. 
Pursuant to Domey, a guardian has a duty only “when there is a 
showing of need and . . . ‘more than sufficient’ resources to provide 
for the [ward].”149  With the costs of nursing home care averaging 
about $77,000 a year, it is difficult to imagine a situation in which 
wards will have “more than sufficient resources” to pay for their 
care so that guardians would have a duty to spend down.150  In fact, 
Donald Domey’s $353,177 of liquid assets was nearly depleted 
within two years due to the costs of his care.151  The depletion of 
assets is not a failure of the older person to save enough to cover 
long-term care costs and still have assets to leave to heirs.152 
Rather, this is the result of guardians not being held to a high 
enough standard to provide adequate protection to a particularly 
vulnerable group of people.  The approaches of California and New 
Hampshire are lacking because they fail to impose a duty on the 
guardian to initiate a spend-down. 
146. Johnson v. Kotyck, 90 Cal. Rptr. 2d 99, 104 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999); see CAL. 
PROB. CODE §§ 2580-85 (West 2002). 
147. CAL. PROB. CODE § 48 (West 2002) (defining interested person); CAL. PROB. 
CODE § 2616 (West 2002) (expanding interested person to “including persons having 
only an expectancy or prospective interest in the estate”). 
148. Johnson, 90 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 104 (quoting 20 CAL. L. REV. COMM. REPORTS 
1001 (1990)). 
149. In re Guardianship of Domey, 960 A.2d 729, 733 (N.H. 2008). 
150. Id.; see also supra notes 40-41 and accompanying text (illustrating the high 
costs of nursing home care and its effect on a ward’s assets). 
151. Domey, 960 A.2d at 731-32. 
152. FROLIK, supra note 1, at 95 (stating specifically that the problem is not the 
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A.	 States Should Impose a Duty on Guardians to Petition Courts 
for a Spend-Down 
To guarantee that wards are receiving adequate protection 
from the needless expenditure of assets, guardians should have a 
duty to petition the court for approval of a Medicaid spend-down 
where the ward requires nursing home care indefinitely. The Illi­
nois approach, where guardians owe a fiduciary duty to their wards, 
should be followed.153  There, the guardian “is held to the highest 
standard of fair dealing and diligence, and his [or her] behavior will 
be closely scrutinized by the courts to insure his adherence to these 
high standards.”154  In In re Connor, the court held that a guardian 
violated his duty to the ward by failing to engage in Medicaid plan­
ning.  In this case, the ward had sufficient assets to pay nursing 
home bills for about five years.155  Thereafter, the guardian could 
have placed the ward’s remaining assets into a prepaid burial plan 
thus rendering her Medicaid eligible.156  If the guardian had 
“[sought] public aid . . . in a diligent and orderly manner,” there 
would have been no need to liquidate the ward’s assets to pay for 
her care.  Ultimately, the guardian’s failure “resulted in [an] unnec­
essary dissipation of estate assets.”157  Consequently, a heightened 
standard of care for guardians is necessary to prevent the needless 
expenditure of the ward’s assets. 
153. In re Estate of Wellman, 673 N.E.2d 272, 278 (Ill. 1996); In re Guardianship 
of Connor, 525 N.E.2d 214, 216 (Ill. App. 1988); In re Estate of Berger, 520 N.E.2d 690, 
697 (Ill. App. 1987). 
154. Berger, 520 N.E.2d at 697; see also Wellman, 673 N.E.2d at 278 (analogizing 
the guardian relationship to “the relation of trustee and beneficiary between the guard­
ian and the ward”).  If this analogy is accurate, then the guardian is bound to follow the 
statutory scheme and fiduciary standards much like the trustee is bound to follow the 
powers and duties outlined in the statutes and trust instrument. See generally Marshall 
v. First Nat. Bank Alaska, 97 P.3d 830, 839 (Alaska. 2004) (holding that “[a] trustee is a 
fiduciary of the highest order and is held to a high standard of conduct”); 76 AM. JUR. 
2D Trusts § 349 (2010) (providing a more detailed description of trustee duties and 
describing a trustee as a fiduciary held to a high standard of conduct and loyalty). 
155.	 Connor, 525 N.E.2d at 214-16. 
156. Id. at 217; see also supra note 66 (providing examples of other non-countable 
assets). 
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B. Imposing a Duty: Promoting Fairness and Equality 
The disadvantages faced by wards (because disposition of 
property must be court authorized) raise serious equal protection158 
and fairness concerns.  Imposing a duty accomplishes the dual pur­
pose of allowing wards to dispose of their property, while alleviat­
ing these serious concerns.159 
Usually, individuals can do whatever they wish with their prop­
erty,160 and people work their entire lives expecting to leave their 
assets to their families.161  However, wards are unable to make im­
portant decisions for themselves or divest assets on their own,162 
and the courts recognize that a guardian’s failure to act leaves the 
ward in “legal limbo.”163  Meanwhile, competent individuals have 
the luxury of engaging in Medicaid planning at any time because 
their actions do not require court supervision.164  Without guardians 
proposing a spend-down, wards cannot dispose of their property 
and, as a result, are left significantly disadvantaged compared to 
their competent counterparts.  Essentially, wards are unable to 
avail themselves of the potential benefits of Medicaid planning, yet 
competent individuals may do so without any judicial supervision. 
Although Medicaid planning may be frowned upon by Con­
gress, “the government itself . . . has established the rule that pov­
erty is a prerequisite to the receipt of [Medicaid].”165  Wards should 
not be left to shoulder all of their nursing home costs merely be­
cause Congress, and many courts, frown upon Medicaid plan­
158. Supra notes 126, 127, 137, 138 and accompanying text. 
159. Supra notes 117-119 (noting that guardians are appointed to protect the in­
capacitated person who is unable to make decisions); see also 42 U.S.C. § 1396r(a)(1)(c) 
(2006); FROLIK, supra note 1, at 72 (noting that individuals in nursing homes require 
skilled nursing care because of their mental and physical condition). 
160. See, e.g., supra note 106 and accompanying text. 
161. See supra note 94 and accompanying text (noting that Congress recognizes 
the instinct to engage in Medicaid planning in order to pass assets on to family mem­
bers); see also In re Keri, 853 A.2d 909, 916 (N.J. 2004); In re Shah, 733 N.E.2d 1093, 
1099 (N.Y. 2000); In re Daniels, 618 N.Y.S.2d 499, 504 (Sup. Ct. 1994) (noting that 
people would rather leave assets to their loved ones than spend those assets on the costs 
of their care). 
162. See infra Appendix (providing statutes outlining procedures by which a 
guardian may divest a ward of his assets with court approval); see FROLIK, supra note 1, 
at 156 (stating that without a guardian wards would be left in “legal limbo”). 
163. FROLIK, supra note 1, at 156 
164. See supra note 137. 
165. Shah, 733 N.E.2d at 1101 (quoting In re Shah, 694 N.Y.S.2d 82 (App. Div. 
1999)); see also Keri, 853 A.2d at 920 (noting specifically that it is not “improper for 
taxpayers to maximize their deductions under our tax laws to preserve income for 
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277 2012] MEDICAID PLANNING AND DUTIES OF GUARDIANS 
ning.166  The fact remains that Medicaid planning is not entirely 
prohibited, and competent individuals may engage in such planning 
without any court approval.167  States participating in the Medicaid 
program are required to comply with the federal statute.168  Gener­
ally, a state cannot impose more restrictions than the federal law 
requires.169  Because Medicaid spend-downs are not prohibited by 
federal law, state law cannot prohibit them either. For example, a 
Connecticut statute states explicitly that a guardian may not impov­
erish his ward for the purpose of qualifying for federal benefits.170 
Despite this clear language, the Connecticut courts have held that 
the statute is inapplicable to Medicaid, based on the foregoing rea­
sons.171  The states may not prohibit these petitions where the fed­
eral government has not proscribed spend-downs. 
Because the cost of nursing home care can quickly deplete a 
ward’s assets,172 and the goal of a guardianship is to ensure that the 
ward “is able to fully participate in life,”173 guardians should have a 
duty to explore available remedies that alleviate costs and protect 
assets; this is especially true in light of the fact that Congress and 
the courts recognize people’s preference to leave assets to their 
166. See, e.g., supra note 100 and accompanying text (providing several cases that 
note Medicaid is to be the payor of last resort and is reserved for the truly needy). 
167. H.K. v. State, 877 A.2d 1218, 1226 (N.J. 2005); Keri, 853 A.2d at 920; Shah, 
733 N.E.2d at 1098; Daniels, 618 N.Y.S.2d at 501-02 (determining that Medicaid plan­
ning is permissible under the current Medicaid laws and it is reasonable for individuals 
to aim to preserve assets for themselves and their families); see also infra Appendix 
(providing statutes for every state which contemplates estate planning by guardians on 
behalf of wards). 
168. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 1396 (2006). 
169. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 1396; FROLIK, supra note 1, at 75-76 (providing 
information about the joint federal-state laws); MEDICAID  AT-A-GLANCE, supra note 
23. 
170. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45a-655 (West Supp. 2011). 
171. State v. Henneberry, No. CV020098667S, 2003 WL 23149933, at *2-3 (Conn. 
Super. Ct. Dec. 16, 2003) (holding that despite Connecticut’s strong public policy 
against spend-downs as a means of qualifying for state or federal aid, “[t]he only excep­
tion to such proscription pertains to” Medicaid and “[t]his exception . . . is in accord 
with . . . federal law”). 
172. See, e.g., In re Guardianship of Connor, 525 N.E.2d 214, 216-17 (Ill. App. Ct. 
1988) (holding that the guardian breached the fiduciary duty owed to the ward by fail­
ing to invest the ward’s assets in a manner so as to qualify her for public aid thereby 
causing “unnecessary dissipation of estate assets”); In re Guardianship of Domey, 960 
A.2d 729, 732 (N.H. 2008) (noting that the ward’s assets were nearly depleted after two 
years of care); see also FROLIK, supra note 1, at 94 (noting that the cost of care will 
greatly deplete an individual’s assets); METLIFE  MATURE  MARKET  INSTITUTE, supra 
note 31, at 14-19 (stating that the average cost of nursing home care is $198 per day). 
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278 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:251 
heirs.174  Requiring guardians to petition the court for a spend-
down alleviates the equal protection and fairness concerns by al­
lowing the wards to avail themselves of planning techniques availa­
ble to competent individuals.175 
C. Imposing a Duty: Practical and Effective 
There are several reasons why imposing a duty is the most 
practical and least invasive solution that would effectively provide 
adequate protection for wards.  First, this duty applies in very nar­
row circumstances to meet the needs of a vulnerable population. 
Requiring guardians to petition the courts ensures that they will ex­
plore all available options and take appropriate action.  Such a duty 
will prevent the guardian from taking less action than necessary,176 
and will avoid shifting the burden of caring for the ward to “inter­
ested persons” who would have to petition the courts to take action 
where the guardian fails to do so.177  After all, a guardian is ap­
pointed to ensure that the ward is not left in “legal limbo”;178 there­
fore, the guardian should have the burden and duty of protecting 
the ward, which encompasses proposing a Medicaid spend-down. 
Instituting this heightened standard of care is administratively 
feasible and efficient.  This specific change in the standard of care, 
in fact, can be accomplished with little or no change to each state’s 
guardian laws.  Currently, each state’s statutes and common law al­
ready contemplate estate planning and gifting by guardians.179  The 
states need only change the duty of the guardian to petition the 
courts, in this specific instance, from permissive to mandatory. This 
change could be effectuated through a common law interpretation 
of the duty or a change in the statutory language.  Moreover, each 
guardian may be informed of this duty by the court upon appoint­
ment.180  In either situation, this change would be highly effective 
174. Supra note 161 (noting that Congress and the courts recognize the instinct to 
leave assets to heirs rather than use those assets to cover costs of care). 
175. See supra notes 126-127; infra Appendix. 
176. See, e.g., Connor, 525 N.E.2d at 216-17 (requiring the guardian to reimburse 
the ward’s estate for costs that could have been avoided if the guardian had engaged in 
Medicaid planning). 
177. CAL. PROB. CODE § 2585 (2002); Johnson v. Kotyck, 90 Cal. Rptr. 2d 99, 104 
(Cal. Ct. App. 1999) (holding “that the conservator is not required to propose any ac­
tion under section 2580” and requiring interested persons to institute the action where 
the guardian does not). 
178. FROLIK, supra note 1, at 156. 
179. Infra Appendix. 
180. One way to ensure that guardians are informed is by requiring them to at­
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279 2012] MEDICAID PLANNING AND DUTIES OF GUARDIANS 
and minimally invasive, as it would affect a narrow population and 
requires only a minor change in the guardianship laws. 
Additionally, this change strikes a balance between a bright-
line rule (imposing a duty on guardians to petition the courts under 
these circumstances) and flexibility (preserving case-by-case analy­
sis and approval based on the court’s discretion).  If guardians are 
required to submit a petition, then the court can determine, based 
on its existing presumptions and statutory and common law factors, 
whether the spend-down is appropriate.181  This minimal change 
not only enables the courts to work within the standards of review 
based on their current state law, but also ensures greater compli­
ance with the law by placing the inquiry with the entity most suita­
ble to properly evaluate a spend-down proposal—the court. 
Because this planning typically requires court approval, guardi­
ans alone should not determine whether the planning is appropriate 
or not.  Rather, the independent judgment should be taken from 
the hands of guardians, who have varying degrees of experience 
and knowledge, and placed with the more apt courts. First, courts 
tend to favor appointing nonprofessional guardians, which means 
more guardians less familiar with complex guardian and Medicaid 
rules.182  Meanwhile, the lesser-appointed professional guardians, 
subject to rigorous licensing requirements, are more likely to be fa­
miliar with court procedure, Medicaid requirements, and various 
planning tools that help wards maintain their wealth.183  Even the 
rudimentary crash course given to newly appointed guardians can­
not dispense with this knowledge disparity;184 at best, it scratches 
the surface of the complexities of the guardian-ward relationship 
and potential dispositions of property the guardian is authorized to 
make.  A mandatory spend-down ensures that a guardian, who may 
be less experienced, will not overlook useful planning techniques 
that prevent unnecessary exhaustion of the ward’s assets. 
181. Infra Appendix (providing the statutes for each state). 
182. See supra note 123. 
183. See, ALASKA  STAT. ANN. § 08.26.020 (requiring a minimum age, casework 
experience, education standard, certification, and criminal background checks); TEX. 
PROB. CODE ANN. § 697 (requiring a statement providing educational background, pro­
fessional experience, references, information regarding value of assets managed, and 
past resignations). 
184. Compare FLA. STAT. ANN. § 744.3145(2) (requiring “a minimum of 8 hours 
of . . . training” (emphasis added)), with ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 08.26.020(a)(2) (requir­
ing at least “two or more years” of experience “or at least an associate degree” in 
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Even though this increases litigation for a busy court, the court 
must already approve dispositions of the ward’s property.185  In 
fact, the court is most familiar with guardian laws, Medicaid spend-
downs, and determining whether a spend-down is in the best inter­
ests of the ward.  Furthermore, it is the court’s duty to ensure the 
safety and well being of the ward by managing and protecting the 
ward’s estate, so the guardian acts merely as the hand of the 
court.186  Given the complexity of the Medicaid and guardianship 
laws187 this is a matter appropriately left in the court’s discretion. 
The cost of busy courts is balanced by the proportionately worth­
while benefit of providing necessary judicial oversight to a particu­
larly vulnerable population and the ruinous long-term care costs to 
which they are subjected.  Therefore, the mandatory petition pro­
tects the wards by ensuring that guardians do not dispose of a po­
tential spend-down by failing to submit petitions on their wards’ 
behalves. 
D.	 Imposing a Duty will not be the Straw that Breaks the 
Medicaid Camel’s Back 
1. Additional Costs for Medicaid 
One criticism of a heightened duty deals with the concerns that 
more planning may require Medicaid to shoulder the costs for some 
individuals sooner than it otherwise might have.  Congress has re­
185. Infra Appendix (noting specifically that the statutes require court approval 
prior to planning). 
186. In re Estate of Wellman, 673 N.E.2d 272, 278 (Ill. 1996) (noting that “[t]he 
guardian only acts as the hand of the court and is at all times subject to the court’s 
direction in the manner in which the guardian provides for the care and support of the 
disabled person”) (citing In re Estate of Nelson, 621 N.E.2d 81, 85 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993)); 
In re Estate of Berger, 520 N.E.2d 690, 697 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987).  In Berger, the court 
defined its power as “function[ing] in a central role which permits it to oversee and 
control all aspects of the management and protection of the incompetent’s estate. The 
court controls the person and estate of the ward, and directs the conservator’s care, 
management and investment of the estate.” Id. at 696-97; accord Probate of Marcus, 
509 A.2d 1, 3 (Conn. 1986) (holding that “[t]he court, and not the conservator” is prima­
rily in charge of caring for the ward’s estate and “the conservator is but the agent of the 
court” acting under its supervision (citing Shippee v. Commercial Trust Co., 161 A.2d 
775, 777 (Conn. 1932))); AmSouth Bank v. Cunningham, 253 S.W.3d 636, 641-42 (Tenn. 
Ct. App. 2006) (holding that conservators act as agents of the court and “that ‘the court 
itself is ultimately responsible for the disabled persons who come under its care and 
protection’” (quoting In re Clayton, 914 S.W.2d 84, 90 (Tenn. Ct. App. (1995))). 
187. See supra notes 128-131 and accompanying text (providing some of the fac­
tors considered before approving a Medicaid spend-down); supra Part II.B. (noting the 
complexity of Medicaid as it applies to planning techniques); infra Appendix (providing 
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281 2012] MEDICAID PLANNING AND DUTIES OF GUARDIANS 
acted to increased Medicaid costs by passing OBRA, and later, the 
DRA.188  Still, Medicaid covers approximately 49% of all long-term 
care costs.189  For these reasons, critics of the proposed change may 
argue that a heightened duty imposed upon guardians would have a 
devastating effect on Medicaid.190  This calamity, however, will not 
necessarily transpire.  First, the duty applies to a narrow population 
comprised only of people who have guardians and are facing an 
indefinite term of nursing home care.  Because the costs of nursing 
home care are so high, and this population will remain in nursing 
home care longer, it is probable that the estates of these individuals 
would be depleted fairly quickly, thus leaving Medicaid to cover the 
costs of their care anyway.191 
Second, while many courts view Medicaid as the payor of last 
resort,192 the modern view of Medicaid has changed and Medicaid 
benefits are not necessarily reserved for the truly needy; rather, 
more middle class individuals rely upon Medicaid for long-term 
care benefits.193  In fact, Medicaid pays for most long-term care 
costs, and most nursing home facilities would go bankrupt if they 
did not receive Medicaid reimbursement for services.194 
Despite clear disapproval of Medicaid spend-downs, Congress 
has not completely closed the door to such planning.  Congress pre­
viously attempted to prohibit such planning with the “Granny Goes 
188. Supra Part II.C. 
189. National Spending on Long-Term Care, supra note 47. 
190. See, e.g., Forsyth v. Rowe, 629 A.2d. 379, 385 (Conn. 1993) (“The medicaid 
program would be at fiscal risk if individuals were permitted to preserve assets for their 
heirs while receiving medicaid benefits from the state.”). 
191. See, e.g., Rainey v. Guardianship of Mackey, 773 So.2d 118, 118 (Fla. Dist. 
Ct. App. 2000) (calculating the ward’s assets, monthly income, and nursing home costs 
and determining the ward had “a monthly deficit of $4,377.78”); In re Guardianship of 
Domey, 960 A.2d 729, 731-32 (N.H. 2008) (noting that the ward’s assets were suffi­
ciently depleted to qualify him for Medicaid after two years nursing home care); In re 
Keri, 853 A.2d 909, 912 (N.J. 2004) (allowing the ward to engage in a Medicaid spend-
down and noting that “$78,000 would be sufficient to pay [her] nursing home [care]” for 
her 16 month penalty period); see also FROLIK, supra note 1, at 94 (noting that the cost 
of care will greatly deplete an individual’s assets); METLIFE  MATURE  MARKET  INSTI­
TUTE, supra note 31, at 14-19 (stating that the average cost of nursing home care is $198 
per day). 
192. Supra note 100. 
193. SADLER, supra note 24, at 80 (noting that more and more middle class indi­
viduals are using Medicaid to cover nursing home costs). 
194. FROLIK, supra note 1, at 75 (noting that residents have over half their care 
paid for by Medicaid); see STONE, supra note 23, at 1 (noting that Medicaid is the larg­
est provider funding nursing home care). But see supra note 100 (providing sources 
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to Jail” Act.195  There, “Congress was so incensed by the practice of 
voluntary impoverishment to obtain Medicaid that it made it a 
crime both for citizens to practice it and for lawyers to advise their 
clients how to do so.”196  Congress later amended the statute, re­
pealing the portions targeting the elderly and replacing it with lan­
guage that criminalized the acts of attorneys who assisted clients 
with transferring assets to qualify for Medicaid.197  Subsequently, 
Attorney General Janet Reno announced that the Department of 
Justice would not enforce these criminal provisions,198 and courts 
have similarly declined to enforce the amended statute that targets 
attorneys.199 
Given the failed attempts to completely prohibit Medicaid 
planning, Congress has instead opted to control costs with more 
moderate measures.  For example, the means Congress has recently 
taken to discourage planning specifically contemplate penalties in 
response to those who continue to engage in spend-downs.200 
Moreover, the penalty periods do not last indefinitely or completely 
eliminate Medicaid eligibility, and there are even some exceptions 
to penalty periods applying in the first place.201  The fact that penal­
ties are responsive and easily calculated by the applicants indicates 
that planning is likely to continue; in fact, new planning techniques 
have developed despite Congressional discouragement.202 
Those concerned about devastating costs must consider that 
the DRA has imposed a longer look-back period and a stricter pen­
195. Miller, supra note 83, at 82; see Health Insurance Portability and Accounta­
bility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191, § 217, 110 Stat. 2008 (codified as amended at 42 
U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(a) (2006)) (imposing criminal sanctions against the Medicaid appli­
cant in some cases); Balanced Budget Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-33 § 4734, 111 Stat. 
522 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(a) (2006)) (imposing criminal sanc­
tions against those who advise clients about Medicaid planning). 
196. Miller, supra note 83, at 81-82. 
197. Balanced Budget Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-33 § 4734, 111 Stat. 522 (codi­
fied as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(a) (2006)). 
198. New York State Bar Ass’n v. Reno, 999 F.Supp. 710, 713 (N.D.N.Y 1998) 
199. Miller, supra note 83, at 82; see Rainey v. Guardianship of Mackey, 773 
So.2d 118, 120 n.4 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000) (noting that “Congress . . . eliminated the 
criminal penalties against persons transferring the assets”); New York State Bar Ass’n, 
999 F.Supp. at 716 (holding that amended Act targeting attorneys was 
unconstitutional). 
200. Supra pp. 11-12 (noting that penalty periods are determined based on a 60 
month lookback period). 
201. Supra notes 76, 78 and accompanying text (providing the method for calcu­
lating the penalty period and listing some exceptions to incurring a penalty period). 
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283 2012] MEDICAID PLANNING AND DUTIES OF GUARDIANS 
alty period.203  These measures, if effective, require individuals to 
spend more of their own assets on their care before they qualify for 
Medicaid, even after engaging in a spend-down.204  Considering the 
narrow population to which the duty applies, and the stringent rules 
imposed by the DRA, it is unlikely that Medicaid would be cata­
strophically overburdened; this is especially true bearing in mind 
the already large portion of long-term care that Medicaid currently 
covers.205 
Furthermore, imposing a duty does not necessarily mean that 
all proposed Medicaid spend-downs will receive court approval and 
thus be implemented.  The courts retain the discretion to approve 
or reject a suggested spend-down based on their state laws.  Courts 
will continue to determine the appropriateness of a spend-down in 
a manner consistent with their current doctrine. For example, those 
proposals in New York and New Jersey are presumptively valid,206 
while those proposals in Pennsylvania must meet a higher burden, 
since there the court views the duty of the guardian as preserving 
the ward’s assets for the ward’s care.207  Consequently, imposing a 
duty in this instance will not necessarily increase the overall burden 
on Medicaid because not all proposed spend-downs would be 
approved. 
2. Judicial Costs 
Despite the narrowness of the population to which the duty 
applies, another criticism to the heightened duty is that it will in­
crease the burden on the judiciary as more guardians will be re­
quired to propose spend-downs to the courts.  Courts are currently 
required to authorize guardian-initiated spend-downs.208  However, 
the majority of states do not impose a duty on guardians to propose 
such spend-downs;209 in fact, California does not even require 
203. Supra notes 76-77 and accompanying text (noting the 60 month look-back 
period imposed by the DRA). 
204. STONE, supra note 23, at 10, 29. See generally Medicaid Rules, supra note 23; 
Transfer of Assets, supra note 95. 
205. Supra note 55 (noting that Medicaid covers approximately 49% of all long-
term care costs). 
206. Supra note 133 and accompanying text. 
207. Supra notes 143-144 and accompanying text. 
208. Infra Appendix (providing each statute that requires court authorization 
before a guardian gifts or disposes of the ward’s property). 
209. See infra Appendix.  Compare California, New York, and New Jersey (all 
allowing guardian spend-downs, but declining to impose a duty) with Pennsylvania and 
New Hampshire (declining to impose a duty because impoverishing the ward is not in 






      05/09/2012   13:22:53
31827-wne_34-1 Sheet No. 146 Side B      05/09/2012   13:22:53
C M
Y K
\\jciprod01\productn\W\WNE\34-1\WNE107.txt unknown Seq: 34  9-MAY-12 12:52
 
284 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:251 
guardians to initiate such an action.210  Although imposing a blan­
ket duty on guardians in these circumstances will certainly busy the 
courts and guardians alike, this duty requires no more than is al­
ready asked of guardians—or courts, for that matter—to do what is 
in the best interest of the ward.211  Furthermore, the courts are the 
entities most capable of exercising discretion to determine if the 
spend-down is truly in the best interests of the ward based on the 
complex Medicaid and guardian laws.212  The benefits received by 
the wards certainly outweigh the costs to the judiciary, or the 
guardians. 
CONCLUSION 
This Note illustrates the practical problems involved with 
Medicaid eligibility, costs of nursing home care, and a person’s in­
stinct to leave assets to his or her loved ones.  Imposing a duty on 
the guardian accomplishes each of the following: (1) it prevents the 
ward from being left in legal limbo; (2) it alleviates equal protection 
and fairness concerns; (3) it requires the guardian to act as intended 
(as a substitute decision maker) and avoids shifting the guardian’s 
duty of care to “interested persons”;213 (4) it strikes a balance be­
tween a bright-line rule, preserving necessary flexibility for the 
courts, and imposing a duty with little or no change to the current 
laws; and (5) it appropriately places the approval of a spend-down 
in the hands of the court (the entity most capable of interpreting 
the complex body of guardianship law). 
Considered separately, each of these goals is persuasive on the 
point of why a heightened duty is necessary to guarantee that the 
ward is adequately protected.  When considered together, these 
210. Johnson v. Kotyck, 90 Cal. Rptr. 2d 99, 104 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999) (holding 
that section 2585 doesn’t immunize the conservator from wrongdoing but provides 
“that the conservator is not required to propose any action under [S]ection 2580”). 
211. In re Keri, 853 A.2d 909, 913 (N.J. 2004) (adopting the Trott criteria and 
holding that guardians may engage in Medicaid planning if the proposed gifts are in the 
best interests of the ward). But see In re Guardianship of Domey, 960 A.2d 729, 733 
(N.H. 2008); In re Adler, No. 1144IC, 2003 WL 22053309, at *3 (Pa. Com. Pl. 2003) 
(holding that the guardian has a duty to protect the ward’s assets and apply them to the 
ward’s care). 
212. See Murphy v. Wakelee, 721 A.2d 1181, 1186 (Conn. 1998) (holding that 
“[t]he court, and not the conservator” is primarily in charge of caring for the ward’s 
estate and “the conservator is but the agent of the court” acting under its supervision 
(quoting Probate of Marcus, 509 A.2d 1, 3 (1986))); see also Shippee v. Commercial 
Trust Co., 161 A. 775, 777 (Conn. 1932) (holding “that the conservator acts merely as 
the agent” and “his duty is to manage the estate of his ward”). 
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285 2012] MEDICAID PLANNING AND DUTIES OF GUARDIANS 
points provide a compelling argument that imposing a duty is neces­
sary to ensure that a guardian is adequately protecting a particu­
larly vulnerable person—the ward—from unnecessary asset 
depletion. 
Perhaps if Donald Domey’s guardians had been required to 
petition the court for a spend-down, rather than merely having the 
“option,” he would not have exhausted hundreds of thousands of 
dollars of assets on the costs of his long-term care.  Rather, Don­
ald’s guardians could have petitioned the court for approval of a 
Medicaid spend-down in which some assets could be divested and 
converted into non-countable resources, and some retained to 
cover Donald’s care expenses during the penalty period he would 
likely incur.  As a result, Donald’s benefits would be twofold: (1) he 
would have been able to provide the support for his spouse, his 
dependent; (2) while also covering the long-term care expenses. 
The loss of autonomy accompanying a guardianship is akin to “the 
loss of freedom following a criminal conviction.”214  This duty not 
only provides more protection for wards facing indefinite nursing 
home stays, but also allows wards to dispose of their property more 
freely, thereby curing the loss of autonomy that accompanies a 
guardianship. 
Angelina M. Pargoff* 
214. In re Conservatorship of Groves, 109 S.W.3d 317, 329 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003). 
* J.D., Western New England University School of Law, 2012. I would like to 
thank the Law Review for working so diligently to prepare my Note for publication, 
Hyman Darling for his help in developing this topic and for his guidance, and my family 
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Guardian Statute: ALA. CODE § 26-2A-136 (LexisNexis 1975).
 
Is Planning Allowed? No current case law.
 
Duty to Plan? No current case law.
 
ALASKA 
Guardian Statute: ALASKA STAT. § 13.26.200 (2010).
 
Is Planning Allowed? No current case law.
 
Duty to Plan? No current case law.
 
ARIZONA 
Guardian Statute: ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-5408 (1956).
 
Is Planning Allowed? Romo v. Kirschner, 889 P.2d 32, 34 (Ariz. Ct.
 
App. 1995) (authorizing the conservator to place funds from an in­
surance settlement into a trust on behalf of the ward and holding
 
that “[i]n reality, the trust was created by [the ward],” but finding
 
the trust to be an available resource, thus rendering the ward ineli­
gible for Medicaid).
 
Duty to Plan? No current case law.
 
ARKANSAS 
Guardian Statute: ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-65-308 (2004).
 
Is Planning Allowed? No current case law.
 
Duty to Plan? No current case law.
 
CALIFORNIA 
Guardian Statute: CAL. PROB. CODE §§  2580-2586 (West 2002). 
Is Planning Allowed? Murphy v. Murphy, 78 Cal. Rptr. 3d 784, 789 
(Cal. Ct. App. 2008) (noting that the probate code codifies the doc­
trine of “substituted judgment” allowing guardians to transfer the 
ward’s property as the ward would have if competent to act). See 
generally In re Guardianship of Christiansen, 56 Cal. Rptr. 505, 511­
12, 523-25 (Cal. Ct. App. 1967) (recognizing the substituted judg­
215. This Appendix provides a sampling of each state’s guardian statutes and 
cases discussing guardian-initiated estate planning and Medicaid spend-downs. The 
author notes that a more comprehensive analysis and comparison are outside the scope 
of this Note, but would be incredibly useful in this area of law (especially given the high 
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287 2012] MEDICAID PLANNING AND DUTIES OF GUARDIANS 
ment doctrine and enumerating factors to be considered before au­
thorizing guardian transfers of the ward’s assets). 
Duty to Plan? Johnson v. Kotyck, 90 Cal. Rptr. 2d 99, 104 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 1999) (holding that Section 2585 does not immunize the con­
servator from wrongdoing but provides “that the conservator is not 
required to propose any action under [S]ection 2580”). 
COLORADO 




Is Planning Allowed? No current case law.
 
Duty to Plan? No current case law.
 
CONNECTICUT 
Guardian Statute: CONN. GEN. STAT. § 45a-655 (2011). 
Is Planning Allowed? Dep’t of Soc. Servs. v. Saunders, 724 A.2d 
1093, 1106 (Conn. 1999) (holding that a court may authorize a con­
servator to transfer a ward’s assets into a Medicaid supplemental 
needs trust in order to maintain the ward’s Medicaid eligibility). 
Duty to Plan? Murphy v. Wakelee, 721 A.2d 1181, 1186 (Conn. 
1998) (holding that “[t]he court, and not the conservator is prima­
rily” in charge of caring for the ward’s estate and “the conservator 
is but the agent of the court” acting under its supervision (quoting 
Marcus v. Dep’t of Income Maintenance (In re Probate of Marcus), 
509 A.2d 1, 3 (Conn. 1986))). 
DELAWARE 
Guardian Statute: DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 12, §§ 3901, 3923 (2007 & 
Supp. 2010). 
Is Planning Allowed? Dean v. Del. Dep’t of Health & Soc. Servs., 
No. Civ. A00A-05-006, 2000 WL 33201237, at *9 (Del. Super. Ct. 
Dec. 6, 2000) (emphasizing the court’s dissatisfaction with the con­
version of countable resources into income, which is not countable 
for the wife’s Medicaid eligibility, but noting that the laws do not 
prohibit such a transaction); In re Tarburton, No. C.M. 8578, 1998 
WL 326667, at *4-5 (Del. Ch. June 18, 1998) (appointing the ward’s 
daughter as her guardian and noting that the guardian had been 
instructed by a social worker as to things she should do to qualify 
the ward for Medicaid, including spending the ward’s assets on non-
countable assets such as funeral expenses). 
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288 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:251 
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 
Guardian Statute: D.C. CODE §§ 21-2055, 2070 (LexisNexis 2008). 
Is Planning Allowed? In re Estate of Tyler, No. 246-00, 2002 WL 
1274125, at *13 (D.C. Super. May 30, 2002) (declining to approve 
spouse’s request to transfer all assets from Tyler to herself on the 
grounds that the spouse failed to establish her need, or any pattern 
of gifting by Tyler, and that unlike New York, the D.C. Code does 
not recognize the substituted judgment doctrine or specifically au­
thorize gifts on behalf of the ward to establish Medicaid eligibility). 
Duty to Plan? No current case law. 
FLORIDA 
Guardian Statute: FLA. STAT. ANN. § 744.441 (West 2010). 
Is Planning Allowed? In re Guardianship of Bohac, 380 So.2d 550, 
552-53 n.7 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980) (holding that the court may 
approve guardian tax and estate planning based on the following 
factors: donative intent; what the ward would do if competent; per­
manency of the ward’s condition; size of the estate; the needs of the 
ward and proposed recipients; whether the recipients of the gifts 
vary from who would otherwise inherit the property; and whether 
the recipients are dependent upon the ward for support (citations 
omitted)). 
Duty to Plan? Rainey v. Guardianship of Mackey, 773 So.2d 118, 
121-22 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000) (affirming the broad discretion of 
the courts to authorize guardian initiated estate planning pursuant 
to the substituted judgment doctrine and factors enumerated in In 
re Guardianship of Bohac but declining to impose a duty on guardi­
ans to attempt to engage in such planning). 
GEORGIA 
Guardian Statute: GA. CODE. ANN. § 29-5-23 (2007 & Supp. 2011). 
Is Planning Allowed? Cruver v. Mitchell, 656 S.E.2d 269, 271 (Ga. 
Ct. App. 2008) (approving appointment of a professional conserva­
tor to consider whether the ward’s property should be sold and the 
proceeds used for her benefit, thus disqualifying her for Medicaid 
benefits). 
Duty to Plan? Cruver v. Mitchell, 656 S.E.2d 269, 271 (Ga. Ct. App. 
2008) (upholding the probate court’s decision to appoint a conser­
vator “who could fully analyze the issues associated with a Medi­
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HAWAII 




Is Planning Allowed? No current case law.
 
Duty to Plan? No current case law.
 
IDAHO 
Guardian Statute: IDAHO CODE ANN. § 15-5-408 (2009). 
Is Planning Allowed? No current case law. 
Duty to Plan? No current case law. 
ILLINOIS 
Guardian Statute: 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/11a-18 (West 2007 
& Supp. 2011). 
Is Planning Allowed? In re Estate of Berger, 520 N.E.2d 690, 705 
(Ill. App. Ct. 1987) (holding that courts may authorize guardians 
making gifts for estate planning purposes to reduce the taxable es­
tate and noting that courts may deny requests when it is possible 
that the ward could recover). 
Duty to Plan? In re Guardianship of Connor, 525 N.E.2d 214, 216­
17 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988) (holding that the guardian breached the fidu­
ciary duty owed to the ward by failing to invest the ward’s assets in 
a manner so as to qualify her for public aid and causing “unneces­
sary dissipation of estate assets”). 
INDIANA 
Guardian Statute: IND. CODE ANN. § 29-3-9-4.5 (West 2010). 
Is Planning Allowed? In re Guardianship of E.N., 877 N.E.2d 795, 
799-800 (Ind. 2007) (holding, as a matter of first impression, that 
the statute does not authorize disposing of the ward’s entire estate, 
but rather authorizes applying or disposing of excess assets not 
needed for the ward’s future support). 
Duty to Plan? First Farmers Bank & Trust Co. v. Whorley, 891 
N.E.2d 604, 613 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (holding that “it is clear that a 
guardian’s duties include estate planning for its protected person, 
while mindful of the best interests of his ward, spouse or family” 
(emphasis added)). 
IOWA 
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Is Planning Allowed? In re Brice’s Guardianship, 8 N.W.2d 576, 
578-79 (Iowa 1943) (holding that the probate court possesses broad 
powers to manage the ward’s estate including the authority to ap­
prove gifts from the ward to one whom no duty of support is owed 
and citing several factors to be considered before such gifts are 
approved). 
Duty to Plan? In re Brice’s Guardianship, 8 N.W.2d 576, 580 (Iowa 
1943) (citing New York case law and holding that “[t]he controlling 
principle is that the court will act with reference to the incompetent 
and for his benefit as he would probably have acted if sane” (em­
phasis added)). 
KANSAS 
Guardian Statute: KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-3078 (2005).
 
Is Planning Allowed? In re Guardianship & Conservatorship of
 
Watkins, 947 P.2d 45, 48 (Kan. Ct. App. 1997) (holding that conser­
vators may establish Medicaid supplemental needs trusts pursuant
 
to both the state and federal law).
 
Duty to Plan? No current case law.
 
KENTUCKY 
Guardian Statute: KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 387.137, 387.125, 
387.065 (LexisNexis 2010).
 
Is Planning Allowed? No current case law.
 
Duty to Plan? No current case law.
 
LOUISIANA 
Guardian Statute: LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:1022-1024 (West 
2008); LA. CODE. CIV. PROC. ANN. ART. 4566 (West Supp. 2011). 
Is Planning Allowed? Sanders v. Pilley, 684 So.2d 460, 466 (La. Ct. 
App. 1996) (holding that a trust created by the ward and his guard­
ian was not considered an asset for determining the ward’s Medi­
caid eligibility and stating that “[the court does] not believe that 
Congress intended through its enactment of 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(k) to 
force a disabled individual . . . to exhaust funds intended to improve 
his qualify of life before seeking Medicaid assistance”). 
Duty to Plan? No current case law. 
MAINE 
Guardian Statute: ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.18-A, §§ 5 408, 425 
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Is Planning Allowed? In re Conservatorship of Jackson, 721 A.2d 
177, 179-80 (Me. 1998) (holding that the conservator had authority 
to convey the ward’s home to his disabled child as retaining a life 
estate, renting the home, or selling it outright would all produce 
assets of value for the ward rendering him ineligible for Medicaid). 
Duty to Plan? In re Estate of Bragdon, 875 A.2d 697, 700 (Me. 
2005) (holding that “[a] conservator has a duty to act as a fiduciary 
and observe the standards of care applicable to trustees”). 
MARYLAND 
Guardian Statute: MD. CODE  ANN. EST. & TRUSTS §§ 13-213, 15­
102 (LexisNexis 2011).
 
Is Planning Allowed? No current case law.
 
Duty to Plan? No current case law.
 
MASSACHUSETTS 
Guardian Statute: MASS. GEN. LAWS. ch. 190B, § 5-407 (2010).
 
Is Planning Allowed? Strange v. Powers, 260 N.E.2d 704, 709
 
(Mass. 1970) (holding that just because an individual is a ward he
 
should not be deprived of the ability to engage in estate planning
 
and as a result be forced into “favoring the taxing authorities over
 
the best interests of his estate”).
 
Duty to Plan? No current case law.
 
MICHIGAN 
Guardian Statute: MICH. COMP. LAWS  ANN. § 700.5407 (West 
2002).
 
Is Planning Allowed? Nat’l Bank of Detroit v. Dep’t of Soc. Serv.,
 
614 N.W.2d 655, 664 (Mich. Ct. App. 2000) (affirming the conserva­
tor’s establishment of a trust on behalf of the ward but finding the
 




Duty to Plan? In re Estate of Hromek, No. 203957, 1998 WL
 
1988943, at *1 (Mich. Ct. App. Nov. 6, 1998) (concluding that the
 
ward needed proceeds from the sale of her stock to cover her care
 
expenses, authorizing the conservator’s sale of the stock, and hold­
ing that “this statute does not create an absolute duty to preserve
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MINNESOTA 




Is Planning Allowed? In re Kindt, 542 N.W.2d 391, 399 (Minn. Ct.
 
App. 1996) (affirming the guardian’s creation of a trust on behalf of
 
the ward but holding that the trust was an available asset to the
 
ward thus defeating Medicaid eligibility).
 
Duty to Plan? No current case law.
 
MISSISSIPPI 
Guardian Statute: MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-13-38 (West 2007).
 
Is Planning Allowed? No current case law.
 
Duty to Plan? No current case law.
 
MISSOURI 




Is Planning Allowed? No current case law.
 
Duty to Plan? No current case law.
 
MONTANA 
Guardian Statute: MONT. CODE. ANN. § 72-5-421 (2009).
 
Is Planning Allowed? No current case law.
 
Duty to Plan? No current case law.
 
NEBRASKA 




Is Planning Allowed? No current case law.
 
Duty to Plan? No current case law.
 
NEVADA 




Is Planning Allowed? No current case law.
 
Duty to Plan? No current case law.
 
NEW HAMPSHIRE 
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Is Planning Allowed? In re Guardianship of Domey, 960 A.2d 729, 
734 (N.H. 2008) (holding that “the probate court may authorize the 
guardian” to engage in estate planning for the ward to minimize tax 
consequences). 
Duty to Plan? In re Guardianship of Phuong Phi Thi Luong, 951 
A.2d 136, 141 (N.H. 2008) (noting that the statute’s legislative in­
tent is “clear on its face” and a guardian may engage in estate plan­
ning for their ward); In re Guardianship of Domey, 960 A.2d 729, 
733-34 (N.H. 2008) (holding that the statute gives guardians the op­
tion to engage in estate planning but does not impose a duty to do 
so unless the ward owes a duty of support to an individual and 
“there are ‘more than sufficient’ resources” to provide for the 
ward). 
NEW JERSEY 
Guardian Statute: N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 3B:12-50, -58 (West 2007). 
Is Planning Allowed? In re Keri, 853 A.2d 909, 913 (N.J. 2004) 
(adopting the Trott criteria and holding that guardians may engage 
in Medicaid planning if the proposed gifts are in the best interests 
of the ward and “such ‘as the ward might have been expected to 
make’”); In re Trott, 288 A.2d 303, 307 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 
1972) (allowing a guardian to make gifts from the ward’s estate to 
reduce estate taxes and enumerating five criteria that must be 
established). 
Duty to Plan? In re Keri, 853 A.2d 909, 916 (N.J. 2004) (declining 
to impose a duty, but establishing a presumption in favor of “spend­
down[s] . . . on . . . ground[s] that a reasonable and competent per­
son ‘would prefer that the costs of his care be paid by the State, as 
opposed to his family’” (quoting In re Shah, 95 N.Y.S2d 148, 160 
(N.Y. 2000))). 
NEW MEXICO 
Guardian Statute: N.M. STAT. ANN. § 45-5-402.1 (West 2003).
 
Is Planning Allowed? Kegel v. New Mexico Human Serv. Dep’t,
 
830 P.2d 563, 567 (N.M. Ct. App. 1992) (concluding that the trust
 
was established by the conservator on behalf of his ward and there­
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NEW YORK 
Guardian Statute: N.Y. MENTAL  HYG. LAW § 81.21 (McKinney 
2006 & Supp. 2012). 
Is Planning Allowed? In re John, 652 N.Y.S.2d 329, 332 (App. Div. 
1996) (holding that “guardians have the authority to effect transfers 
of assets for the purpose of rendering incapacitated persons Medi­
caid eligible” and noting that a contrary result deprives wards of 
options available to competent persons). 
Duty to Plan? In re Shah 733 N.E.2d 1093, 1099 (N.Y. 2000) (de­
clining to impose a duty but agreeing that “any person [comatose 
and with limited private insurance benefits] would prefer that the 
costs of his care be paid by the State, as opposed to his family”). 
NORTH CAROLINA 




Is Planning Allowed? No current case law.
 
Duty to Plan? No current case law.
 
NORTH DAKOTA 
Guardian Statute: N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-29-08 (LexisNexis 
2010). 
Is Planning Allowed? Linser v. Off. of Att’y Gen., 672 N.W.2d 643, 
649 (N.D. 2003) (noting that the ward’s guardian established a spe­
cial needs trust as a means of qualifying the ward for Medicaid, but 
holding that the trust assets were available to the ward therefore 
disqualifying him from eligibility). 
Duty to Plan? Reinholdt v. North Dakota Dep’t of Human Serv., 
760 N.W.2d 101, 106 (N.D. 2009) (holding that the ward’s guardians 
breached their fiduciary duty to her by relinquishing her right to all 
of the marital assets in a divorce action as a means of qualifying the 
ward for Medicaid). 
OHIO 
Guardian Statute: OHIO REV. CODE. ANN. § 2111.50 (West 2005). 
Is Planning Allowed? Vieth v. Ohio Dep’t of Job & Family Serv., 
No. 08AP-635, 2009 WL 2331870, at *9 (Ohio Ct. App. July 30, 
2009) (holding that marital assets which were used by the ward’s 
wife to purchase annuities for the sole benefit of the community 
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Duty to Plan? In re Ewanicky, No. 81742, 2003 WL 21469181, at *2­
4 (Ohio Ct. App. June 26, 2003) (holding that the guardian was per­
sonally liable to the ward’s estate for damages incurred when the 
guardian failed to pay the ward’s health care expenses and timely 
file for Medicaid assistance). 
OKLAHOMA 
Guardian Statute: OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 30, § 3-121 (West 2009). 
Is Planning Allowed? McAlary v. State ex rel. Dep’t of Human 
Serv., 233 P.3d 399, 406 (Okla. Civ. App. 2009) (holding that the 
trust established by the wards’ daughter was an available resource 
to the wards rendering them ineligible for Medicaid as the trust was 
funded by the wards’ own money and the wards applied for Medi­
caid just one day after the funds were placed in the trust). 
Duty to Plan? In re Guardianship of Lee, 982 P.2d 539, 541 (Okla. 
Civ. App. 1999) (finding that the ward resided in a nursing home 
with income insufficient to meet her expenses and holding that the 
guardian had “both the authority and duty to retrieve assets from 
[the ward’s trust] for [her] benefit and to the extent necessary to 
provide for [her] needs” (emphasis added)) 
OREGON 




Is Planning Allowed? In re Baxter, 874 P.2d 1361, 1363 (Or. Ct.
 
App. 1994) (declining to decide whether Oregon statutes authorize
 
Medicaid planning and refusing to approve guardian creation of a
 




Duty to Plan? No current case law.
 
PENNSYLVANIA 
Guardian Statute: 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5536 (West 2005). 
Is Planning Allowed? In re Adler, No. 1144IC, 2003 WL 22053309, 
at *6 (Pa. Com. Pl. March 19, 2003) (noting that “[i]t is plainly per­
missible for guardians in Pennsylvania to perform estate planning 
and to make distributions from estates when such actions are in the 
best interests of the ward”). 
Duty to Plan? In re Adler, No. 1144IC, 2003 WL 22053309, at *6 
(Pa. Com. Pl. March 19, 2003) (declining to authorize a guardian 
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adopt a presumption that the ward’s intent was to “sacrifice . . . her 
own comfort for the benefit of others,” and noting that “most peo­
ple seek to enjoy the benefits of their own property for as long as 
possible”); Pomroy v. Dep’t of Public Welfare, 750 A.2d 395, 398 
(Pa. Commw. Ct. 2000) (holding that the law clearly obligates a fi­
duciary to “use [the ward’s] resources . . . prior to receiving any 
further governmental assistance”). 
RHODE ISLAND 




Is Planning Allowed? No current case law.
 
Duty to Plan? No current case law.
 
SOUTH CAROLINA 
Guardian Statute: S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-5-408 (West 2009).
 
Is Planning Allowed? No current case law.
 
Duty to Plan? No current case law.
 
SOUTH DAKOTA 
Guardian Statute: S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 29A-5-420 (2004). 
Is Planning Allowed? Striegel v. South Dakota Dept. of Soc. Servs., 
515 N.W.2d 245, 246 (S.D. 1994) (noting that the guardian was 
given authority to transfer the ward’s assets into a trust, but holding 
that Medicaid is not to be used as an estate planning tool, therefore 
the assets are available to the ward and the ward is ineligible for 
Medicaid benefits). 
Duty to Plan? Meyer v. South Dakota Dep’t of Soc. Serv., 581 
N.W.2d, 151, 157-58 (S.D. 1998) (emphasizing that Medicaid is “not 
free insurance coverage for those who have resources available to 
them to pay their medical expenses”). 
TENNESSEE 
Guardian Statute: TENN. CODE ANN. § 34-1-122 (2007). 
Is Planning Allowed? In re Conservatorship of Childs, No. M2008­
02481-COA-R3-CV, 2011 WL 51740, at *4 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 5, 
2011) (noting that the conservator received Medicaid approval for 
the ward and after the trial court granted conservator’s motion to 
liquidate the ward’s insurance policies to apply to proceeds to fu­
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Duty to Plan? Grahl v. Davis, 971 S.W.2d 373, 377-78 (Tenn. 1998) 
(holding that conservators owe a fiduciary duty to their wards but 
that the conservators primary duty is to preserve the estate of the 
ward). 
TEXAS 




Is Planning Allowed? Paredes v. Alexander, No. 03-08427-C, 2004
 
WL 3383446 (Tex. Dist. Oct. 18, 2004) (creating a special needs
 
trust on behalf of the ward).
 
Duty to Plan? No current case law.
 
UTAH 




Is Planning Allowed? S.S. v. State, 972 P.2d 439, 440 (Utah 1998)
 
(noting that after the ward received Medicaid, conservators were
 
appointed and authorized to place $150,000 of insurance funds in a
 
special needs trust on the ward’s behalf).
 
Duty to Plan? No current case law.
 
VERMONT 
Guardian Statute: VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 3069 (2010).
 
Is Planning Allowed? Samis v. Samis, 22 A.3d 444, 445, 450 (Vt.
 
2011) (noting that the lower court approved a stipulation ap­
pointing a guardian and providing that the guardian and husband of
 
the ward would cooperate in financial and Medicaid planning on
 




Duty to Plan? No current case law.
 
VIRGINIA 
Guardian Statute: VA. CODE ANN. § 37.2-1024 (2005). 
Is Planning Allowed? In re Rudwick, No. 01-633, 2002 WL 
31730757, *6 (Va. Cir. Ct. Dec. 5, 2002) (holding that the conserva­
tor is authorized to revoke the ward’s trust based on board powers 
granted to conservators in the statutory scheme as well as the non-
preclusive language of the trust instrument). 
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WASHINGTON 
Guardian Statute: WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 11.92.140 (West 2006 
& Supp. 2011). 
Is Planning Allowed? In re Estate of Sullivan, No. 49266-7-I, 2003 
WL 1742631, at *4 (Wash. Ct. App. Mar. 31, 2003) (noting that 
“§11.92.140 authorizes a guardian to determine an incapacitated 
person’s intent regarding his or her estate, including the intent to 
qualify for federal and state medical assistance programs” (emphasis 
added)). 
Duty to Plan? In re Estate of Sullivan, No. 49266-7-I, 2003 WL 
1742631, at *4 (Wash. Ct. App. Mar. 31, 2003) (holding that the 
professional guardian owed a duty to represent the ward’s best in­
terests and she violated this duty by failing to ascertain the ward’s 
intent and by attempting to block the property conveyance which 
would “result[ ] in no benefit to her ward due to his status as a 
Medicaid recipient” as retaining the property would likely render 
the ward Medicaid ineligible). 
WEST VIRGINIA 




Is Planning Allowed? No current case law.
 
Duty to Plan? No current case law.
 
WISCONSIN 
Guardian Statute: WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 54.20-.21 (West 2008). 
Is Planning Allowed? A.G. v. Dept. of Human Servs. (In re Guardi­
anship of Scott G.G.), 659 N.W.2d 438, 443-44 (Wis. Ct. App. 2003) 
(holding that a court may authorize the guardian to place the 
ward’s assets into a Medicaid Payback Trust in accordance with 
Wisconsin and federal statutes and noting the ward’s incompetency 
should not prevent him from taking advantage of the extra re­
sources that can flow from the trust). 
Duty to Plan? V.D.H. v. Circuit Court (In re Guardianship of 
F.E.H.), 453 N.W.2d 882, 885-87 (Wis. 1990) (noting that the guard­
ian has an affirmative duty to manage a ward’s estate in the ward’s 
best interests and holding that the lower court abused its discretion 
by failing to consider whether a guardian could make a transfer to 
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WYOMING 
Guardian Statute: WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 3-3-607, -801 (2011). 
Is Planning Allowed? No current case law. 
Duty to Plan? No current case law. 
